An Anſwer *to a late* Pamphlet,

ENTITULED

Obedience and Submiſſion to the Preſent Government, Demonſtrated from Bp. Overall's *Convocation-Book.*

WITH

A POSTSCRIPT in Anſwer to Dr. Sherlock's *Caſe of Allegiance.*

THE Author for Introduction begins with charging the Non-Swearers with *Malice* or *Ignorance*, for reproaching thoſe of the Church of *England*, who have taken the Oaths, with deſerting their Principles.

Perhaps the Author thinks it a very *malicious* Thing in them, to be deprived of their Livings and Preferments, (for what other Inſtances of *Malice* they have been guilty of I cannot deviſe,) Well, it was ſpightfully done of them to loſe their Livelihoods, and, in ſuch a reflecting manner, to reproach thoſe who ſwore, and kept or advanced theirs: Whereas they might have taken the Oaths, and if they could not with a good Conſcience, at leaſt they ought to have done it to ſave the Reputation of their Brethren. The other Branch of the Charge is *Ignorance*, and if by that the Author means; That they do not know, but thoſe have deſerted their Principles, for my part, I confeſs the Fact, I am thus ignorant, and I wonder when we ſhall be better inform'd. They have often been called upon, to ſhew the Conſiſtency of their preſent Practices, either with the General Principles of the Church of *England*, or with their own Principles heretofore, but they will not vouchſafe to do it. And for any thing this Authour or any other hath ſaid, we are ſtill like to be kept in Ignorance.

We confeſs plainly, we have not Skill to reconcile them, and we want their help, and if they will not afford it us, and reconcile them themſelves, whoſe Fault is it? Tis true, they are not ſparing of Arguments taken out of *Parſons* the Jeſuite, and from the *Rebels* in the Year 42. and from the Advocates of *Cromwel*'s Uſurpation. Theſe we meet with in every Pamplet, but we hope we may be pardon'd, if we do not take theſe for Principles of the Church of *England*, and a man may look his Eyes out, before he can find any other; and this Author is the firſt that ever pretended to produce any publick Act of the Church of *England* in favour of ſuch Practices, and how fairly he hath done it, we ſhall ſee by and by.

In the mean time, if what he alledges from thence were true, (as it is not,) it will by no means juſtifie them; for it is at beſt but a pretence taken up after the Fact: And as a ſubſequent Law cannot condemn, ſo neither can it juſtifie a Fact previous to it. And I preſume there is not one ſingle Perſon, but what had taken the Oath, either before the publication of the *Convocation-Book*, or without any reſpect to it: So that

w'atever the Sense or Authority of that *Convocation* may be, it signifies nothing to justifie or excuse the Proceedings of those who knew nothing of it, nor acted with any manner of reference to it. Let them shew any other publick Act of the Church, any Opinion of one of the approv'd Sons of the Church of *England*, the Practice of any one that own'd her Principles, in favour of the Doctrines they now teach, and the Practices they now follow, and then they say something: But in vain do they pretend to justifie themselves from a *Convocation-Book*, when they had done the Fact before they ever heard of, or saw the Book they pretend to justifie themselves by. This Authour talks of *Demonstration* from this Book, but it concerns him, and others that call themselves of the Church of *England*, to demonstrate it from something else, or they can never satisfie their Consciences, that they have acted in Conformity to the Principles of the Church of *England*; for those who had done the Business long before, can never shelter themselves by any Proofs taken from this Book, if any such there be; and whether there are or no, we come now to examine.

The Authour says, *That he lays down the Doctrine about Government and Allegiance in four Propositions, extracted out of the Convocation-Book, to which almost the whole Controversie may be reduc'd.*

And they are these:

1. *That the Power of Kings was originally Patriarchal, Derived from God, and not from the People.*

2. *That Descent in Hereditary Kingdoms, is the Ordinary way whereby a Right and Title to the Crown is claimable.*

3. *That no Violence is to be used to Kings from their own Subjects, for any Irregularities they commit.*

4. *That having Sworn Allegiance to a Prince, we cannot, without the dreadful Guilt of Perjury transfer our Allegiance, whilst he continues to have an Authoritative Right and Title to the Crown.*

Now 'tis to be remember'd, that the Authour saith, that these *four Propositions* are extracted out of the Convocation-Book. I suppose he does not mean, That they are all there, in so many Words, (for that is not so;) but that he hath in them delivered the sense of the Convocation about *Government and Allegiance*; and whether he hath faithfully done so, is the subject of the present Enquiry. And I shall shew, and (since the Author is delighted with the word) *demonstrate*, That he hath omitted many things that are material, and pertinent to the present Controversie about Government and Allegiance. That what he hath drawn up into these Propositions, he hath in some of them (if not in all) curtail'd and diminish'd the full sense of the Convocation. That, above all, by adding words and Limitations, and Glosses, and Explications, he hath destroyed the Text, and perfectly corrupted and perverted their Sense: I shall shew this in examining the particulars.

The first Proposition I shall examine last, because the Authour builds upon it, and says, *it is the Ground-work of the whole Discourse*, and gives occasion for Enquiry into it afterwards. P. 6.

The second Proposition is thus in the Authour: *That Descent, in Hereditary Kingdoms, is the ordinary way whereby a Right and Title to the Crown is claimable.* And that we may be sure not to mistake him, he adds, *I say, is the ordinary way:* But I say, that *Ordinary way* is his own, and not in the Text, nor can be made out *in the sense of the Authour:* For though there may be some extraordinary ways in hereditary Kingdoms, that may give a Right and Title to the Crown, besides Descent, as God's P. 4.

God's particular Nomination and Appointment, the Extinction or Submiſſion of the Right Heirs. Yet the Authour's *extraordinary way* is none of them: For though in explaining this Propoſition he tells us (according to the Convocation,) that the Lord may and is able to overthrow Kings, notwithſtanding any Claim, Right, Title, or Intereſt, that they can challenge to their Kingdoms; yet if he be conſiſtent to himſelf, by all this he means only God's *permiſſive Providence*, in permitting another Perſon to take Poſſeſſion of the Crown: And then I ſay again, that this is not the ſenſe of the Convocation, but the contrary; and let any man read the ſeventeenth Canon of the firſt Book, and he will ſoon be ſatisfied. *If any Man ſhall affirm, That the Kingdom of* Judah *by God's Ordinance going by Succeſſion, when one King was dead, his Heir was not in Right their King, (howbeit by ſome* Athaliah *he might be hindred from enjoying it,) or that the People were not bound without any farther circumſtance, upon ſufficient notice of their former King's Death, to have obeyed his Heir apparent, as their Lawful King, he doth greatly err.*

Ps 14.

From whence there is nothing more plain, than that the ſenſe of the Convocation is, that notwithſtanding any uſurped Poſſeſſion of the Crown, and ſuch as *Athaliah*'s was, (*which continued ſome Years,*) the People were *bound* to pay Obedience to the Right Heir, as their lawful King. And then I wonder what becomes of *Poſſeſſion*, and *permiſſive Providence*: And before the Authour can demonſtrate otherwiſe, he muſt firſt demonſtrate this *Canon*, and a great many other things out of the Book. But of this more hereafter.

The third Propoſition is, *That no Violence is to be uſed to Kings for any Irregularities that they commit.* This does fully expreſs the Senſe of the Convocation, but the Authour's Comment deſtroys it. The Authour, in explaining or proving this Propoſition, ſays; *For the Doctrine of Paſſive Obedience to a Government eſtabliſhed by Law,* (then by the way, there is no *Paſſive Obedience* due to a Government not eſtabliſhed by Law,) *whether the Prince be limited, and ſworn to govern by* Laws *choſen by the People, and enacted with his Conſent, or the Prince be abſolute, and his Will ſufficiently declared, be the* Law, *is of abſolute neceſſity to the ſupport of any Government.* From whence, it ſeems, that the Authour hath got Mr. *Johnſon*'s *Paſſive Obedience*, and limits it to the *Laws*, and not to the *Prince*: And if ſo, this is not only a plain Contradiction to the Convocation, but to his own extracted Propoſition; for that is, That Kings are to receive no *Violence* from their Subjects for any *Irregularities they commit*. Now though *Irregularities* is a fine word, and not in the Convocation, yet I ſuppoſe the Authour does not mean leſs by it, than a Prince acting and governing againſt Law, eſpecially joyned with that Univerſal, *for any Irregularities they commit.* And then I aſſume, that *Paſſive Obedience* is due to a lawful Prince, notwithſtanding, and upon his acting and governing againſt Law. And this I am ſure is the Senſe of the Convocation; and if the Authour cannot tell how to extract this *Propoſition*, I have been ſo civil as to extract it for him.

The fourth Propoſition is, *That, having ſworn Allegiance to a Prince, we cannot, without the dreadful Guilt of Perjury, transfer our Allegiance, whilſt he continues to have an Authoritative Right and Title to the Crown.* Now I would gladly know, from what place of the Convocation-Book this Propoſition is extracted. The Print refers us to *Canon* 36. but there is nothing in that Canon of Oaths or Allegiance, and therefore, that I ſuppoſe is the Errour of the Preſs, and it ſhould be *Can.* 30.

where there is ſomething of it, but not one word of the Authour's Limitation *of the Continuance of an Authoritative Right and Title*, but the contrary. Jaddus, *when* Alexander *(having overthrown* Darius*) ſent to him to aſſiſt him in his Wars, and become Tributary to the* Macedonians, *as he had been to the* Perſians; *return'd for Anſwer, That he might not yield thereto, becauſe he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to* Darius, *which he might not lawfully violate whilſt* Darius *liv'd.* Now I ſuppoſe that *whilſt* Darius *lived*, is not whilſt he continued to have an Authoritative Right and Title, and he muſt have an extraordinary Faculty at *Demonſtration*, that can demonſtrate them to be the ſame; and beſides, the Convocation ſuppoſes that *Darius* had not at that time that Authoritative Title the Authour mentions; for they tell us expreſly, That this was *when* Darius *was eſcaped by flight, after his Army was diſcomfited*: And therefore once again I deſire the Favour, this the Authour would tell me, were he had this *Authoritative Right and Title*; for there is not one word of it in the Convocation-Book, nor any thing like it. I know the Authour is reſolved to have it, and
P. 5. therefore preſently adds, *I ſay Authoritative Right and Title.* Well, the Authour may ſay what he pleaſe, what is that to me, or to the Buſineſs? The Queſtion is not what the Author ſays, but what the Convocation ſays. The Authour perhaps may think it better to transfer his Allegiance to any Power, than to be bound up by his Oath; and if he like it, he may enjoy his own humour; but then let him not father this upon the Convocation, and make them ſay what they never intended, nor
Ibid. thought on. The Authour goes on, *The Caſe may ſo happen, that theſe being ſeparated, the Claim of Right, without the Authority, cannot challenge our Allegiance.* The contrary to which is as expreſly delivered and aſſerted by the Convocation, as any thing can be, as in the Caſe of *Joaſh* and *Athaliah*, (*Chap.* and *Can.* 23.) where, notwithſtanding *Joaſh* had none of our Authour's *Authoritative Right and Title*, and had only *Claim of Right, without the Authority*, "Yet when *Jehoiada* called the "People together, and being acquainted with the Preſervation of their "Prince, they all together by a Covenant acknowledged their Allegiance "to him, as unto their lawful King; ane in conſequence of that ſlew *Athaliah* the Uſurper. And the Convocation adds, That, "In all the proceſs of P. 41, 42.
"which action nothing was done which "God himſelf did not require at their "Hands; and the Reaſon of this they "give, *Joaſh*, their late King's Son, "being then their only natural Lord "and Sovereign, although *Athaliah* "kept him for ſix Years from the Poſſeſſion of his Kingdom.

This is plain enough, and needs no farther inſiſting on; and what Opinion ſoever our Authour may have of his own Notion, *That the Claim of Right, without the Authority, cannot challenge Allegiance*: Yet I hope he will hereafter be careful how he aſcribes it to the Convocation. I am contented to own with the Authour, That the Caſe may ſo happen, That Authority (in the Authour's Senſe) and Right may be ſeparated; but the Queſtion is, whether Allegiance may be ſeparated from Right, and transferred to Authority without Right. That the Authour does, but the Convocation never aſſerted: It is plain in the foregoing inſtance, That, according to the Convocation, Right without Authority may and ought to challenge Allegiance; and it is as plain from the ſame and other Inſtances, that Authority without Right cannot challenge it. There are indeed ſome Inſtances of transferring Allegiance, mentioned and juſtified in the Convocation Book; and our Authour, and ſome others preſently conclude from thence,

That

That they juſtifie paying and transferring Allegiance to any Perſon poſſeſſed of Power, though without Right, nay, againſt it. And this is a fundamental Miſtake, and ariſes for want of conſidering, That in theſe Caſes the Convocation never requires, nor juſtifies the transferring Allegiance, but only where the Right is transferred likewiſe. Thus in the Caſe of *Jehu*, the Convocation expreſly aſſerts, That *Jehu* was the *lawful* King, and *Joram* was then his Subject; (*i.e.*) the Right was in *Jehu*, and not in *Joram*. So alſo of *Ahud*, when he was authoriſed to kill the King of *Eglon*; he was firſt made a Judge, Prince, and Ruler, and the Convocation ſays expreſly, That "It is not "lawful for any Perſon whatſoever, "upon pretence of any Revelation, In"ſpiration, or Commandment from "God, either to touch the Perſon of "his Sovereign, or to bear Arms a"gainſt him, except God ſhould firſt "advance the ſaid Perſon from his pri"vate Eſtate, and make him a King. So that 'tis plain, in the ſenſe of the Convocation, there was firſt a Right before Allegiance became due, and they challeng'd Allegiance only by virtue of that Right. And the ſame may be ſaid of their Submiſſion and Obedience to the *Babylonians*, the *Perſians*, *Macedonians*, and the *Romans*, all mentioned and juſtified by the Convocation-Book, theſe reſpective Governments had a Right of Government over the *Jews*, though not in the ſame manner with the former by God's expreſs Nomination, yet they acquired a Right by the Submiſſion and acknowledgment of thoſe, in whom the Right was; and for the proof of this I ſhall look no farther than our Author, who tells us expreſly (*pag.* 8, 9) *That the Kings of* Iſrael *and* Judah *became not only Tributary but Subjects to the Kings of* Babylon. And then I wonder what the Author means by ſaying upon this Propoſition, (*pag.* 5.) *That the Claim of Right without the Authority cannot challenge Allegiance, as in the Caſe of the Kings of* Iſrael *and* Judah, *that were led Captive by the* Babylonians, *who they ſurvived in* Babylon, *and ſome of them out of Confinement.* For what if they did ſurvive, and whether they were in, or out of Confinement, yet, being *Subjects*, what claim of Right had they? And the Author himſelf ſays, that, *being Subjects, whatever other duty might, yet Allegiance could no way be due to them*; and what Right ſoever they might have before, by becoming *Subjects* they had transferred it to the King whoſe *Subjects* they were; and that with the Submiſſion of the People I hope was ſufficient to make a Right in thoſe Princes to that Government, and in conſequence of that Right to make Allegiance to become due: So that however the Author may contradict himſelf, it is plain in all the Inſtances the Convocation mentions and juſtifies, Allegiance followed Right, and not meerly Poſſeſſion, or (as our Author calls it) Authority.

It is objected from *Joſephus*, (L. 11. C. 8.) *That* (*whatever he might anſwer*) Jaddus *actually became a Subject to* Alexander *while* Darius *was alive, and alſo before he was totally and finally ſubdued: For* Joſephus *tells us, that after the taking of* Tyre, Alexander *being diſpleaſed with* Jaddus's *Anſwer, came directly to* Jeruſalem, *upon whoſe approach* Jaddus *in his Pontifical Attire meets him, and ſubmits to him, and* Alexander, *inſtead of executing his revenge, falls down before him, as having in a Viſion at* Dio *ſeen a Perſon ſo attired*, &c.

To this I anſwer,

I. That the Story it ſelf is very ſuſpitious.

II. If it were true, it would not prove what it is alledged for.

I. The

1. The Story is very ſuſpicious, upon theſe two Accounts:

1. No Author, beſides *Joſephus*, and thoſe that had it from him, mentions or takes notice of any ſuch thing. There is not the leaſt footſtep of it in *Diodorus Siculus*, or *Plutarch*, or *Quintus Curtius*, or *Arian*, or *Juſtin*, all very good and diligent Hiſtorians; and (to ſay the Truth of them) every one of them a more creditable Authour than *Joſephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* was much nearer the time, and wrote 150 years before *Joſephus*, and each of them gives a punctual account of the whole Progreſs of *Alexander*, and yet not one word of *Jaddus*, or *Jeruſalem*. Now if it were true, as *Joſephus* records, it is as memorable a paſſage as any in the whole Expedition; and it is a ſtrange thing, that thoſe who are ſo punctual as to tell us of his wanting Sleep, of his Dreams, and of his taking Phyſick, ſhould yet pretermit, and ſilently paſs over a thing every way ſo remarkable. And what is yet more ſtrange, if *Joſephus* be in the right, they tell us the clean contrary, *viz.* That from the Siege of *Tyre*, *Alexander* went directly to *Gaza*, and ſo on into *Ægypt*, to the Temple of *Jupiter Hamon*, and ſo from place to place, till he came to *Gangomela*, where he fought the laſt Battel with *Darius*.

2. The Difficulty of reconciling it with Chonology. *Joſephus* tells us, *That* Manaſſes *the younger Brother of* Jaddus, *Married the Daughter of* Sanballat, *and for which* Jaddus *depoſed him from the Prieſthood, and* Sanballat *for to encourage him, by leave obtained from* Alexander, *built a Temple in* Samaria, *and made* Manaſſes *High-Prieſt. Now* Sanballat *was* Prefect *of Syria*, and Governour of the *Samaritans*, when *Nehemiah* built the Walls of *Jeruſalem*, and diſturbed the Building, *&c.* This was

Neh. 2. 19. 4. 1. 6. 1. 2. 1.

the 20th Year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*. Now from the 20th Year of *Artaxerxes*, to the taking of *Tyre*, is 115 Years, and it is thus computed:

	Years.
Artaxerxes Longimanus reigned	41
Darius Nothus	19
Artaxerxes Mnemon	43
Ochus	23
Arſes	3
Darius Codomanus	6

From which ſubtract 20 of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and there remains 115. Now as *Calviſius* obſerves, the Government of *Syria* and *Samaria*, being a Place of great Authority and Truſt, *Sanballat*, when the Government was conferred upon him, could not be a young Man, but of good Years and Experience; and the leaſt we can ſuppoſe him to be at the beginning of his Government, (and how long that might be before *Nehemiah*'s going up to *Jeruſalem*, the Scripture is ſilent; but it is certain, that it was before) is of the Age of 30. And add this to the former Account,

115
30

145

And then *Sanballat* at that time muſt be One hundred forty and five years old.

And it is to be obſerv'd, that this is the ſhorteſt Computation, and I believe the trueſt. Thoſe who reckon *Sogdianus*, and a ſecond *Xerxes*, as Kings of *Perſia*, make it yet longer. And *Jaddus* and *Manaſſes* could not be much younger: For that *Nehemiah* (*Ch.* 13. *ver.* 21.) takes notice of this Marriage with the Daughter of *Sanballat*, and (*Ch.* 12. *ver.* 22.) intimates *Jaddus*'s then being High-Prieſt. Now *Brittius* tells us, That *Nehemiah* dyed the laſt Year

Year of *Artaxtrxes Longimanus*, and from the Death of *Artaxerxes*, to the taking of *Tyre*, as appears by the Computation, is 94 Years. Now how long *Nehemiah* wrote his Book before he dy'd does not appear; nor is it certain how old *Jaddus* and *Manasses* then were. But it is plain, That *Manasses*, the younger Brother, was then married; and 'tis probable *Jaddus* was then High-Priest, and I think the least we can allow for the time of *Nehemiah*'s Living, after he ended his Book, and for the marriageable Age of *Manasses*, and then for *Jaddus*'s Age, as elder than him, the least we can allow is 30 Years, and it is very probable it was much more. To this add 94, the former Computation, and then *Jaddus*, at that time *Josephus* fastens this Story, must have been 124 Years old.

And this is the least and lowest account: But if we take *Josephus* his Computation, it will be yet much longer; for he tells us *Nehemiah* built the Walls of *Jerusalem* the 28th Year of *Xerxes*, and dyed some time after. And then from the Death of *Xerxes*, accounting, it will be 41 Years more, even all the time of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and then *Jaddus* must have been One hundred sixty and five Years old.

Years.
41
124
165

These are Difficulties that have perplexed all Chronologers, and some finding it impossible to reconcile it, have been tempted to reject this Story of *Jaddus* and *Sanballat*, as a mere invention of *Josephus*.

There are but two things said, that will make this account of *Josephus* so much as probable; but both of them are as unaccountable as *Josephus* himself. Some, as *Calvisius*, &c. set the going of *Nehemiah* to *Jerusalem* sixty Years forwards in the Reign of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*: But all those that do so, fix the time of finishing the second Temple (to make their Account hang together,) not in the Reign of *Darius Hystaspis*, but of *Darius Nothus*. But this (besides that it is against the Judgment of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Eusebius*, and all Chronologers till *Scaliger*,) instead of clearing one Difficulty, it makes more and greater: For if the second Temple was finished in the Reign of *Darius Nothus*, then *Ezra*, and all those that saw the first Temple, and survived the building of the second, must have been at least 180 Years old; and then also *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* must have lived to 145 Years. The Compute is thus; The Temple of *Solomon* was destroyed in the Eleventh Year of *Zedechiah*, and that was eleven Years after the beginning of the *Babylonish* Captivity. The Captivity lasted 70 Years, and all agree that these 70 Years ended sometime in the Reign of *Cyrus*, and probably three Years before his Death. Now from those 3 Years of *Cyrus*, to the 6th of *Darius Nothus*, in which (saith *Calvisius*, and those that follow that Account) the second Temple was finish'd, is 115 Years.

	Years.
Cyrus	3
Cambyses	7
Inter. Mag.	1
Darius Hystaspis	36
Xerxes	21
Artax. Longim.	41
Darius Nothus	6
	115

To this add 59 Years of the Captivity, and 6 Years to a Child to lodg any thing in his memory: and then *Ezra* and the rest must have been of the Age of 180

Years.

Years.
115
59
6
180

Compare 2 King. 25. 18. 21. *and* Ezra 3. 1.

Now that *Ezra* was living at the Deſtruction of the firſt Temple appears; for that his Father *Seraiah* was then ſlain by *Nebuchadnezzar*. And that ſeveral others, who ſaw the firſt Temple, and were returned from Captivity, and living at the building the ſecond, is evident from the Prophet *Haggai*, Ch. 2. ver. 3. *who is left among you that ſaw this Houſe in her firſt Glory? And how do ye ſee it now? is it not in your Eyes in compariſon of it as nothing?*

Ibid. P. 151. *Calviſius* takes notice of this, pretending to anſwer it, by ſaying, that theſe words do not mean, as if any one that had ſeen *Solomon*'s Temple was then alive; but they are ſo to be taken, as if he had ſaid, *If*, or *Oh that any of you had ſeen, &c.* in the ſame manner that our Saviour's Words are to be underſtood, *what man among you having a hundred Sheep, &c.* and that they might collect the largeneſs of the Temple from the Foundations of it, and from the Compaſs of Mount *Moria*. As if the Prophet had only ſpoken a Parable to them, or as if by ſeeing the *Glory*, he only meant the *Rubbiſh*: Whereas 'tis plain, that the Prophet does not mean ſight in Imagination and alluſively, but actual ſeeing, and ſuch as whereby they might compare one with the other, *Is it not in your Eyes in compariſon of it as nothing?* and how could that be, except their *Eyes* had ſeen the Glory of the firſt Temple, as well as the meanneſs of that they then ſaw? And why ſhould the ſame word (*ſee,*) and relating alſo to the comparing one object of Sight with another, in the ſame line, be underſtood in two different ſenſes, in a metaphorical and a proper ſenſe; and if not, then they actually; and in a proper ſenſe ſaw the Temple in her firſt Glory, as they did ſee it in the mean condition it then was. And this is the ſenſe of all the Interpreters I have met with, and particularly of St. *Hierom* (*in locum*). And the Prophet plainly ſeems to refer to that of *Ezra*, Ch. 3. ver. 12. and which was but 12 or 13 Years before, *The Prieſts and Fathers that were ancient Men, and had ſeen the firſt Houſe, when the Foundation of this Houſe was laid before their Eyes, wept with a loud voice, and many ſhouted aloud for Joy.* And this I hope is not a Scene in the Fancy or merely ſeeing the Foundations: For why ſhould the ſight of the *Rubbiſh* ſo mightily affect them? Or what need the mention of *ancient Men?* Or what could be the Reaſon of that great difference, that ſome ſhould weep with a loud Voice, and others ſhout for Joy? For all ſaw the Foundations alike; and the young Men ſaw them as well as the ancient Prieſts and Fathers. It is plain therefore, That ſome of thoſe that were at the building of the ſecond Temple, ſaw the firſt Temple in its Glory, and while it ſtood; but then it is as plain, that the ſecond Temple was finiſh'd in the Reign of *Darius Hyſtaſpis*, and conſequently that *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* went up to *Jeruſalem*, not in the Reign of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*, but of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*; and then it will follow, that if *Sanballat* liv'd to the time of *Alexander*, he muſt at the Siege of *Tyre* have been 145 years old.

But however *Calviſius* thought he had got an Anſwer to that of *Haggai*; yet the Caſe of *Zerubbabel* and *Jeſhua* perplexes him, and he does not know what to ſay to it: For it is plain that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeſhua* (the one as Governour, the other as High-Prieſt) went up to *Jeruſalem* upon the Edict of *Cyrus*, and continued in their reſpective Stations till the Temple was finiſhed, and probably ſome time after; but if that

that Temple was not finiſhed till the 6th. of *Darius Nothus* then both *Zerubbabel* and *Jeſhua* muſt have been of the Age of 145. which is the ſame difficulty with *Sanballat*; for from the Edict of *Cyrus* to the 6th. of *Darius Nothus* is, as appears before, 115 years; and to this add 30. as a Competent age to qualifie them for ſuch great Offices, and that makes 145.

Magna eſt hæc diſtantia, cujus exemplum par in nulla alia hiſtoria dari poteſt. Ibid. 141.

Animadv. in Euſeb. Chron. p. 50.

Calviſius plainly confeſſeth, That this is a great diſtance, and that there is not the like Example in any other Hiſtory. I know *Scaliger* makes nothing of it, as if it had been a very ordinary matter for men to live ſo long, but for all that it would have puzzled him, to have given but a few Inſtances; and thoſe that have been they are famous, and as much taken notice of by Hiſtorians, as great Prodigies; and that alſo (like our old *Parr*) though it be of Men of the moſt private condition and extraction, and much more if it were of Princes and Governours; and yet neither *Joſephus* himſelf, nor any other Hiſtorian takes the leaſt notice either of *Zerubbabel* or *Jeſhua*, or of *Sanballat*, *Nehemiah*, or *Jaddus*, living to any wonderful Age. And this I think is another prejudice to the Story.

But there is one thing more, and which I take to be full out as wonderful, and that is, that *Zerubbabel* ſhould continue Governour of the Jews (as he muſt do, if *Calviſius* be in the right) under 7 Succeſſive Kings of *Perſia*, and theſe of ſuch differing Tempers and Inclinations, and eſpecially with reſpect to the Affairs of *Judæa*; ſuch inſtances are as rare in the World, and perhaps more rare, than for a Man to live to 150 or 200 Years. This Chronologers and Hiſtorians (as faras my reading ſerves) do not take notice of, and yet I think it perplexes the Cauſe as much, and is as hardly to be reconcil'd to the common Obſervations among Men, as ſuch wonderful long Lives.

Theſe are difficulties that are not eaſily reconcil'd; and therefore ſome take another way, and ſuppoſe that there were 2 *Sanballats*, and 2 *Jadduſes*, one in the time of *Nehemiah*, and the other of *Alexander*; but beſides that, *Joſephus*, nor no other Hiſtory intimate any ſuch thing: It would be one of the ſtrangeſt accidents in the World; for to make the Story compleat, you muſt not only ſuppoſe two *Sanballats*, two *Jadduſes*, but that each of the *Jadduſes* had a Brother, which Married the Daughter of each of the *Sanballats*, and for which reſpectively they were depos'd from the Prieſthood. Now ſuch a concurrence of all circumſtances is like the *Platonick* year; and is not likely to return ſooner. Or if ſuch a ſtrange thing ſhould happen is it probable that all Hiſtories would have been ſilent of it?

And all this plainly ſhews, with what difficulties this matter is clogg'd, and how perplex'd Chronologers have been with it; and the conſequence is, that it is very unreaſonable to make an Argument of, or draw any inference in reference to practice from ſuch a doubtful and ſuſpitious Story. For if it will not be granted, (as I ſuppoſe it will not very eaſily) that there were 2 ſuch *Sanballats*, *Jadduſes*, *Daughters* and *Brothers*, if it will not be granted that *Ezra*, and thoſe that ſurviv'd the Captivity and the building the ſecond Temple, liv'd to above 180 years, or that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeſhua* liv'd each of them to near 150, and (which is all out as ſtrange) that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeſhua* continued Governor and High Prieſt under 7 ſucceſſive Kings of *Perſia*; or if it will not be granted that *Sanballat* liv'd to above 145, and *Jaddus* himſelf to above 124. and all theſe mighty Ages not in the leaſt mention'd by any Hiſtorian, then it will follow that the Story of *Sanballat* and *Jaddus*, with reſpect to the Times of *Alexander*, is a miſtake in *Joſephus*.

And it is farther to be obſerv'd that, the placing of *Sanballat* and *Jaddus* to the Times of *Alexander*, is a main Ground of th'perplexity among Chronologers, whereas had they rejected *Joſephus*'s Authority in this, as they do in other matters relating to the *Perſian* Monarchy, they would not have been put upon ſuch difficulties, as to allot ſuch mighty Ages to particular Men.

Calviſius ſays, *That the Hiſtories on both ſides (i. e.* the Account of *Joſephus*, and his own) *are ſo manifeſt, that whoever takes either of them it is neceſſary to aſſign either to* Jeſhua *and* Zerubbabel, *or to* Nehemiah *and* Sanballat, *an Age of above* 140 *Years.* And this is true enough, if *Joſephus* his Account be admitted, but if it be rejected, then there would be no need of making Men live to ſuch prodigious Ages, to fill up the ſpaces. Let it be but granted that *Joſephus* is out in his Account of *Sanballat* and *Jaddus* (as he is notoriouſly in other matters relating to thoſe times;) and then the Times would be computed by more moderate and accountable Ages. And the *Jewiſh* Chronologers do not only condemn *Joſephus* in other matters, but in this very particular they affirm, That the Temple on Mount *Gitizim* was built long before the Times of *Alexander*; and that all the time of *Alexander*, *Simeon juſtus* was High Prieſt: Now *Simeon juſtus* was the Son of *Onias*, and the Grandſon of *Jaddus*.

Hiſtorias in utraque parte adeo manifeſtas eſſe, ut neceſſe ſit in utraque ſententia alterutrius horum vel Jeſuæ *&* Zorobabeli, *vel* Nehemiæ *&* Sanballet, *tantam ætatem concedere, quæ major ſit annis centum & quadraginta.* Ibid. *p.* 149.

Chronologia Divid Ganz *edita per* Vorſtium. *pag.* 287. 246. 58.

And (to ſay no more) we have the Judgments of two very conſiderable Authours, and who were not at all concern'd in the preſent Controverſie, and which I ſuppoſe was never before ſtarted. Our excellent *Lydiat*, ſpeaking of *Sanballat*. ſaith, *Either this was another from him that was Father in Law to one of the Sons of* Joiada, *whom* Nehemiah *mentions*, *or elſe* Joſephus *is equally falſe and contrary to himſelf, in determining the Age in which* Sanballat *liv'd, as he is in almoſt all the Chronology of the* Perſian *Monarchy.*

Nimirum aut hic alius fuit ab eo unius filiorum Joiadæ *filii* Eliaſhibi *Socero, cujus meminit* Nehem. *cap. ult. aut æque falſus, & ſibi ipſi contrarius eſt* Joſephus, *in definiendo Sæculo* Sanballeti, *ac in pleraque alia Chronologi. Monarchiæ Perſicæ.* De Emendat. Temp. *p.* 65.

Johannes Temporarius in his Chronology, *l.* 3. *p.* 197. ſpeaking of this matter, ſays, *That* Jaddus *and* Sanballat, *which are ſpoken of by* Joſephus, *either they are diverſe from thoſe mentioned by* Ezra; *or, which I rather ſuſpect, they are the moſt vain Fictions of* Joſephus *himſelf, concerning* Jaddus *and* Sanballat.

Jaddus *&* Sanballatus, *qui in Hiſtoria* Joſephi *recenſentur, aut alii ſunt ab iis qui ab* Ezra *memorantur, vel, quod magis ſuſpicor, vaniſſima ſunt* Joſephi *Commenta de* Jaddo *&* Sanballato.

But beſides theſe Difficulties in Chronology, there are ſeveral Inconſiſtencies in the Story it ſelf, noted by *Salian*, as that the *Phœnicians* and *Chaldæans*, who followed *Alexander*, thought to have plundered the City; and how ſhould he have *Chaldæans* in his Army, when as yet he had not taken *Babylon* nor come near to *Chaldæa*? *Joſephus* a little after ſays, that the *Jews* beſought *Alexander*, that he would ſuffer the *Jews* who lived about *Babylon*, and *Media* to uſe their own Laws and Rites; and which he freely granted: Whereas at that time he had not conquered *Babylon* nor *Media*, nor ſo much as been at them. He tells us that the Army was aſtoniſhed to ſee *Alexander* worſhip *Jaddus*; and *Parmenio* asked him how he that was ador'd by all, ſhould himſelf now adore the High Prieſt of the *Jews*; whereas at that time *Alexander* never thought of being ador'd, or did believe himſelf the Son of *Jupiter*, that Madneſs came upon him firſt in *Ægypt*, and which was not till a year after. *An. Mun.* 3722.

And now does any man think, that a Sto-

a Story, that is thus clogg'd with so many and those insuperable Difficulties, fit to make an Argument of, or that any regular Inference, or Conclusion can be drawn from thence in reference to our practices, especially in a matter of such mighty weight and concernments, as that which is before us? It is worth the while to observe the account *Calvisius* gives us of *Josephus*, and his History of those times. *They that rest upon the Authority of* Josephus *stand upon a very slippery and weak Foundation.* And farther adds, *When* Josephus *is so much out concerning these times, who can safely give Credit to what he asserts?* Now this Story of *Jaddus* and *Alexander*, and the assigning of *Sanballat* and *Jaddus* to that time, stand purely upon the Authority of *Josephus*, and not only so, but in a manner contrary to much better Authority; But however, if that Authority (in matters relating to those times) be not sufficient to be rely'd on, then it follows, that the Story of *Jaddus* is not to be depended on; and standing upon a Foundation so slippery and infirm, is not of sufficient Authority to be drawn into an Argument. And it is not only *Calvisius*, but all Chronologers give us the same Character of *Josephus*; and his Errours and Mistakes concerning those times are so many and gross, as would make any man, that acted upon Principles of Sincerity, very fearful to use an Example taken out of him, in matters of Practice; for however Chronologers may dispute, and whatever Arguments may be raised in matters of less moment, yet when it comes to a point of Conscience, Men that have a care of their Souls, will hardly venture to act upon one single Example, and that also vouch'd but by a single and suspicious Authority. An Argument from Example is at best but a poor one; but it must be very poor indeed, when the Example it self is doubtful. The Practice of the High Priest in that corrupt state of the Jewish Church, will not signifie much to us and no more in this than in their other Immoralities; and *Jaddus* becoming a Subject to *Alexander*, contrary to his Oath, is no more a Pattern for us to follow, than *Eliashib*'s building a Chamber in the Temple for *Tobiah*, is an Argument for us to act contrary to the express Laws of God: but then it must needs signifie much less, when that Practice wants sufficient Clearness and Evidence to prove it. Neh. 13. 4.

Qui Authoritate Josephi nituntur, illi insistunt Fundamento valdelubrico & infirmo. Et paulo post, *Cum circa hæc tempora Josephus ita aberret, quis tuto ipsius assertioni fidem præbere ausit?* Ibid. p. 148.

If it be said here, *That, whether the Story be true or no, the Convocation seems to believe it, and have inserted part of it into the Convocation-Book; and it is not the matter of Fact, but their Sense we are enquiring into:* I say so too; but I say likewise, That there Sense is not to be extended beyond their words, nor are they to be made Parties to any more of the Story than they have inserted in their Book.

They mention and thereby approve *Jaddus*'s Answer to *Alexander*, tha the had sworn Allegiance to *Darius*; and therefore could not violate his Oath so long as *Darius* liv'd. And from thence we may conclude, that their Sense is, That an Oath of Allegiance was binding to a Prince, so long as he lived, and had not given up his Right, tho he was beaten in the Field, and fled before his Enemies.

But for the other part of the story of *Jaddus* submitting to *Alexander* while *Darius* was living, the Convocation takes no Notice of it, nor do's it any where appear, that they thought *Darius* was then living; and therefore from hence nothing can be concluded as to their Sense.

And I ask those who from the instance of *Jaddus* urge Submission to a Possessor of power, notwithstanding an

Oath to a lawful King, who is alive, and insists upon his Right, Whether they argue from the Story; or from the Convocation Book? If from the Story, it is false, or at least suspicious. If from the Convocation Book, they say nothing of it. And if there be nothing in the Premisses, there must be likewise nothing in the Conclusion. But,

2. Grant the Story true, it is not to the purpose it is urged for. *Josephus* tells us that God appeared to *Jaddus* in a Dream, and warn'd him to submit to *Alexander*, and to meet him in that Solemn manner he did. So that this is a Singular and exempt Case, and falls within the circumstances of *Jehu* and *Ahud*.

If it be said, *That Prophecy at that time was departed from the Jewish Church, and therefore they could not have any Revelation.*

I answer, That *Haggai* and *Zacharias*, and after them *Malachi*, prophesied in the time of the second Temple, and it is generally concluded for the space of 40 Years. And after them the had an inferiour degree of Prophecy, which lasted for a long time, as the *Bath Kol*. and probably some other ways, as by Dreams, *&c.*

It was always the custom in the Jewish Church, in Cases of great Extremity and Emergency, to have recourse to God for some express Revelation, what they should do. And here *Josephus* tells us, were all the Preparations to it: They fasted and prayed, and the next night God appeared to *Jaddus*, (however as we have the Story from *Josephus*, so we must take it all from him, and he tells expressly, that God appeared to *him*,) and ordered him so to do, and God's appearing and Command stands upon the same Authority with all the rest of the Story. And then it is wholly besides the purpose it is alledged for: For there is a wide difference between acting by common and standing Rules, and by express Revelation: and if these Gentlemen will shew us any express Revelation for what they do, as *Jaddus* had, then they say something; but till they can shew that, this Example of *Jaddus*, if it were true, will do them no Service.

I now come to consider the first Proposition, which (*page* 3.) stands thus: *That the Power of Kings was originally Patriarchal, derived from God, and not from the People.* But when the Authour comes to repeat it, (*p.* 6.) he makes another thing of it: *That Government in general, whether Monarchy, or any other form, derives its Authority from God, the Authour of Nature, and consequently of human Society, and not from the People, (though their Consent be ordinarily necessary to the Constitution both of the Form of Government, and the Persons governing, &c.)* Now whether the Authour, who undertakes to demonstrate things out of the Convocation Book that never were there, will also undertake to demonstrate, that these two are one and the same Proposition. But for my part, I am disappointed: For finding the first Proposition twice mentioned, I thought (to save the Readers pains and my own, and to prevent needless repetition) to have considered the same Proposition in both places at once. But I am mistaken: For though the Authour calls them both the first Proposition, they are no more like one another, than a Apple is like an Oyster; and it would have been more to the purpose, to have called the one the first Proposition, and the other the last.

And as to the first of the first Propositions, I have only this now to observe: That the Authour by his Exposition of it hath expounded away the Sense of the Convocation, as he always does: *For* (saith he *pag* 3.) *Though Kings are or ought to be bound up, and limited*

limited in the exercise of their Power by Laws. By what Laws I pray? And who ought to bind them up? Why could not this be expressed in the words of the Convocation, and which the Author refers to, *Ch.* 1? which are these: *It is manifest in the Scriptures, that the Kings in the old Testament were as strictly bound to the observation of God's Laws in their Government, as* Moses, *&c.*

And it sounds a little harsh to say that God *ought* to bind them up, and limit them, and by the Authour's disjunctive *are or ought to be bound up.* It is plain he means what the Convocation does not, for all Princes, whether absolute or not, are already, and ever were strictly bound to the observation of Gods Laws in their Government. He is their superiour, and to him onely they are accountable; but their Power being derived from God, and not from the People they are not accountable to them for any exercise of that Power, whether they exercise it justly or unjustly And this is the sense of the Convocation; and this if the Authour had pleas'd, he might have deduc'd from his Proposition, and much more naturally, than by troubling his Readers with an impertinent Rant about Absoluteness, and the Conceits of it.

I am at length come to that which the Authour says is *the Groundwork of the whole Discourse.* And that is the last of his first Propositions. And here I will not much trouble my self with the Repugnances and Disagreements between this and his first Proposition, which notwithstanding he calls the same. He tells us here *that Government in general* (and that I am sure is not Patriarchal; for that is a particular kind of it) *whether Monarchy, or any other form,* (and that also is not Patriarchal, nor originally Patriarchal, but a Corruption of it, and deviation from it,) *derives its Authority from God, the Authour of Nature, and consequently of human Society.* What the Authour means by these last words I cannot tell; they are not in the Convocation, and I suspect he hath some bad meaning in them. They seem to intimate as if God was the Authour of Government no otherwise than as he is the Authour of Nature, (I suppose he means human Nature.) And having made Mankind of a sociable Nature, by that they were directed to Society, and from that to Government. For he says God the Authour of Nature, and *consequently,* (i. e.) consequential to that Nature of Humane Society. And if this be his meaning, it is not only a perfect contradiction to the whole Stream of the Convocation Book, but to his own first Proposition, which tells us, *That Government was originally Patriarchal.* It follows in the Authour, *and not from the People, (though their Consent be ordinarily necessary to the constitution, both of the Form of Government, and the Persons governing.)* Now we must remember again, that the Authour says, *he hath extracted these Propositions out of the Convocation Book.* Sure he hath got a Convocation Book of his own, which no Body ever saw but himself; for all the Books we have deliver the clean contrary almost in every Page. If the Authour thinks the Peoples Consent ordinarily necessary to the Constitution both of the Form and Persons, it is plain the Convocation never thought so, but the contrary. And if he please he may dispute the Point against them. But he must not impose upon us, and make us believe that he demonstrates out of the Convocation, when he delivers things most contrary to what they do.

Well, at last however, through all the Authours Shufflings and Intermixings, we are got to this Point, *That Government derives its Power from God, and not from the People.* And what I pray does this Demonstrate? A Man would imagine that this demonstrated, That Kings held only of God, That the People

People of all sorts and Ranks had nothing to do with the Government, nor could call Kings to account for their Administrations. And so indeed the Convocation concludes, but the Authour had no mind to meddle with that. But forsooth *from the Right Reverend the Authour he observes* Three things.

P. 6. And is not this an admirable way of giving the Sense of an Authour to put some of his words into Propositions, and then to give us the sense of those Propositions, not from the places where they are mentioned, nor from the Inferences or Conclusions the Authour himself draws from them, but by Observing something, and that differing from the Authour's Sense in some other parts of his Book. At this rate a Man may extract Chalk from Cheese, or any thing out of any thing. Well, but what is it that this Authour observes,

He observes——

That all Kingdoms are now (what was more peculiarly appropriated to the Jewish *Nation) in their first Constitution in some sort* Theocracies. Now the Authour may observe this, if he please; but to say that he observes this from the *Right Reverend the Authour*, is like all the rest; for *the Right Reverend the Authour* observes no such thing at all. This Authour observes, That *now* all Kingdoms are in a sort *Theocracies*: but the Convocation observes that God govern'd the World by the Ministry of Civil Magistrates *always*, and no more *now* than heretofore, even before the *Jewish* constitution. This Authour observes that all Kingdoms are in a sort *Theocracies*.

But this is his own *peculiar* observation, and I doubt he will find it hard to observe this not only from the Right Reverend Author, but even from any other, for by that the Convocation and all Men else hitherto have understood, God's governing the Jews in a peculiar manner, immediately by himself, and distinct from other Nations. And does not the Authour say, *it was more peculiarly appropriated to the Jewish Nation.* And how will he reconcile that to all Nations? But we live in an Age where all our old Standards are thrown down, and new ones raised in their Room; we have had a new Notion of Allegiance, a new Notion of Succession, and a new Notion of Right and Wrong, and now our Authour gives us a new Notion of *Theocracy*, by which he means God's permissive Providence; and any Man that God permits to get the Possession of Power in other Kingdoms, he has as good a Title to the Peoples Allegiance, as if he had been (among the Jews) expressly constituted a Ruler and Governour by God himself, and as particularly named, as *Moses*, *Joshua*, or any of P. 83, 4 the Judges. For having cited out of the Convocation, That God being the Lord of the World, and in the Government of it, useth the Ministry of Civil Magistrates, as well in other Countries as among his own peculiar People *Israel*. And that he holds himself the Helm of every Kingdom, and useth their Services in such sort, as to Exercise his own just Judgments, Will and good Pleasure.

Now (saith the Authour) *This the* P. 7 *does by reserving to his Providence the Prerogative of Designation of the Person whom he intends for his Vicegerent.* Now by this the Author does not mean Providence proceeding according to Legal Right and Justice; or if he does, it is not to his purpose; and yet all this may be done, and not a Tittle of any Man's single Right violated. But Providence permitting the Possession of Power, contrary to all Law and Right among Men; and to make such a Providence the Foundation of Obedience, and which is more, of transferring Allegiance, notwithstanding the most sacred Engagements to the contrary, is a most absurd and ungodly Doctrine, as will appear presently.

In

In the mean time, the Authour is very unfortunate in proving his Principles. For to prove that Providence designs the Person of the Sovereign *in other Kingdoms* (as well as in *Judah*,) he instances the disappointment of *Adonijah*, *Solomon*'s Elder Brother; as if de did not know that this was done in the Kingdom of *Israel*, and that *Solomon* was designed King in the Room of *David* not by Providence, but by God's expreſs Nomination.

P. 8. Well, for all that on goes our Authour, and proves it from another Instance in the Kingdom of *Israel*, and by God's expreſs appointment; as the Caſe of *Rehoboam*, and *Jeroboam*, and the rending of the Ten Tribes. And not content with theſe, he tells us farther, *That the Hiſtory of the Kings of* Israel *amply Teſtifie, how God had extinguiſhed the Line Royal, and advanced to the Crown ſuch as had no relation to it.* And are not theſe now pure Proofs of a *Theocracy in other Kingdoms*? And that God by his Providence deſigns the Perſons of his Vicegerents in *other Nations* as well as *Iſrael*, for that was the Authour's firſt Obſervation? Well, it may be he might *obſerve* it in other Kingdoms, but he hath only *prov'd* it in the Kingdom of *Judah*. But I muſt not let his inſtance of *Rehoboam* paſs, to which the Authour thus delivers:

God ſometimes, for the only deſigned uſurpation of a Prince, whoſe Title, and that in an Hereditary Kingdom, was altogether indiſputable, does deprive him of the Government in part or whole, and will not allow him ſo much as to endeavour the regaining it, which was the Caſe of Rehoboam. There are two things deſerve Reflection: The one is that *Rehoboam*'s not regaining the Ten Tribes was expreſly forbidden by God, and ſo nothing to our Authour's purpoſe. But had he not had that expreſs Prohibition, might he not then have endeavoured to regain them, notwithſtanding any *Providential Permiſſion* of *Jeroboam*'s poſſeſſing himſelf of them? This is the Caſe, and I think neither the Authour nor any body elſe will deny but he might. And then it follows that the permiſſion of Providence is no Rule for Acquieſcence or Submiſſion to thoſe Perſons whom Providence permits to poſſeſs themſelves of Power.

The other is a foul prevarication of Scripture. The Authour ſays, that God deprived *Rehoboam* of his Government for his *only deſired uſurpation.* Compare Whereas the Scripture is as expreſs as 1. Kin. 12 can be, that it was for the Idolatry of 15. and his Father *Solomon*. I confeſs I the 11. 11. 33 leſs wonder that he prevaricates with the Convocation, that can make thus bold with the Scripture it ſelf.

From the whole Obſervation the Authour ſays, *All that I will note hence is, that the Line of Deſcent in an Hereditary Kingdom may be interrupted, and yet the Law of Succeſſion not violated.* Not violated? That is one of the ſtrangeſt things in the World; not violated in the Caſe of *Jeroboam*? nor violated when the Authour ſays, ſuch were advanced to the Crown who had no *Relation* to it? Perhaps the Authour may ſay, it cannot properly be ſaid, That God by ſo doing, did violate the Law of Succeſſion. But he may obſerve that the reaſon of that is, becauſe God is above the Law, and not ty'd to obſerve it, and ſo he does not violate, what he has no Obligation to obſerve. In the mean while the Law is not kept, and no Man can ſay that the Law of Succeſſion was obſerv'd, when *Jeroboam*, or others, that had no Relation to the Regal Line were advanc'd to the Crown: And all that I ſhall note hence is, That the Authour extracts *Notes*, with as little Fairneſs, as de does *Propoſitions*.

His ſecond Remark is, *That a Sovereign may be diveſted of his Power which her received from God, and declins into the inferiour Condition of a Subject.* P. 8. Very well: But the Queſtion is how this may be? And the Convocation tells us, two ways, ——— When

When God expreſly nominates and appoints another Perſon to be King, as in the caſe of *Jehu* and *Ahad*. Or by the Submiſſion and Acknowledgment of thoſe in whom the Right was, as in the Caſe of *Ariſtobulus* and his Sons. Theſe
P. 77. are all the Convocation mentions, and to do the Authour Right, theſe are all that he extracts out of them in this Obſervation. And let the Authour take which he pleaſe, or both of them, and make his beſt of them.

3. His third Remark is, *That when a Prince is thus diveſted of his Power from God, and another advanc'd to his Throne, our Legal Allegiance may juſtly be claimed by the Poſſeſſour.*

Now let us connect the ſecond Remark with this, and they run thus: That a Sovereign may be diveſted of his Power, and decline into the inferiour condition of a Subject. And when he is *thus* diveſted, (*i. e.*) when he declines into the inferiour condition of a Subject, why then I know nothing to the contrary, but Allegiance may be tranſferred to the Prince whoſe Subject he is. And if the Authour pleaſe to demonſtrate, that one in the world is a Subject, or a Subject in the preſent Government, he may ſave himſelf the labour of any other Demonſtration: But till he does that, all his Demonſtrations are beſide the Cuſhion. For tho he produces the Convocation with a great deal of Confidence, we ſhall find upon examining it, that it will by no means ſerve his turn, nor in the leaſt prove what he deſigns by it, nor any way countenance ſuch Submiſſion as the Authour pleads for.

The mighty Place is this, *Ch.* 28. *p.* 57.
P. 10. The Convocation, taking notice of the variation of Governments in the World, hath theſe words. "And when having "attain'd their ungodly deſires, (whe-"ther Ambitious Kings, by bringing "any Country into their Subjection; or "diſloyal Subjects, by their Rebellious "Riſing againſt their natural Sove-"reign,) they have eſtabliſh'd any of "the ſaid *degenerate Forms of Govern-"ment* amongſt their People; the "Authority either ſo unjuſtly gotten, "or wrung by force from the true and "lawful Poſſeſſour being always God's "Authority, (and therefore receiving "no Impeachment by the wickedneſs "of thoſe who have it,) is ever (when "any ſuch Alterations are throughly "ſetled) to be reverenced and obey-"ed, and the People of all ſorts, as "well of the Clergy, as of the Laity, are "to be ſubject unto it, not only for "fear, but alſo for Conſcience ſake.

Upon which the Author ſaith, *All that can be moved hereupon is, when a Government may be ſaid to be ſetled.* If the Author pleaſeth he may put it into the words of the Convocation, and that is (more than mere ſetled) *throughly ſetled.*

And to reſolve that Queſtion our Authour adds, *And with ſubmiſſion I can't but conceive, that the Government is ſettled when the Crown, with all its Dignities, Prerogatives, Adminiſtrations, Authorities, Revenues,* &c. *are gentrally recogniz'd, and perſonally enjoy'd; which muſt be ſuppoſed to be, when all Places of Power and Truſt, of Royalty and Importance, are in the Sovereign's hands, and wholly at his diſpoſal.* Now I ask the Authour, whether the Government of *Limerick* be a Place of *Power, Truſt,* and *Importance?* If it be, then the Authour's Notion of a Settlement (if it were true) will do him no ſervice, nor can he prove we ought to ſubmit. For as yet all Places of Power, Truſt, and Importance, are not in his hands, nor at his diſpoſal and conſequently the Government is not *throughly ſetled*, according to the Author's own Account of ſuch a ſettlement, If it be ſaid that place is in *Ireland*, and *England* is a Kingdom entire of itſelf, then what becomes of the poor *Iriſh* men? I doubt they muſt be Rebels for all our Authour's Demonſtration; and then alſo, what can be ſaid to juſtifie a War there,

and

and excuſe the Army's fighting againſt a Prince who hath both Right and Authority. If it be ſaid *Ireland* is a branch of the Crown of *England*, annex'd to it, and dependent of it; then I ſay that the *Crown with all its Dignities, Authorities, Revenues*, &c. *are not perſonally enjoy'd*, and then according to our Authour the Government is not *ſettled*; and ſo he has made a fair *Demonſtration*. He demonſtrates, we ought to ſubmit, when the Government is ſetled, and then he Demonſtrates the Government is not ſettled, and ſo we ought not to ſubmit. Well; however let us for once ſuppoſe that the Crown and all its Dignities, *&c.* (I ſuppoſe the Authour excepts a Right Title) are recogniz'd and enjoy'd, What then? Why then, *with ſubmiſſion*, the Authour *cannot but conceive the Government is ſettled*. Now we muſt remember that the Authour tells us, that in his Book, Obedience and Submiſſion to the Preſent Government is *demonſtrated* from the Convocation; and it is to be noted likewiſe, That this is all he offers us for *Demonſtration* out of that book, and is his *cannot but conceive to Demonſtrate*. I hope the Author does not think all his *Conceits Demonſtrations*, how ſtrongly ſoever he may be poſſeſs'd with them. Well, it muſt be own'd, how bold ſoever the Authour is in his Aſſertions, he is very modeſt in his Proofs: It is in the Title, high and lofty *Demonſtrate*, but in the Proof very humble and meek, he *can't but conceive*, and that alſo *with Submiſſion*.

But whatſoever the Authour may conceive, it is plain the Convocation does not conceive that the enjoyment of the *Crown with all its Dignities*, &c. is that *thorough Settlement* to which is due Submiſſion and Obedience, as to God's Authority; as in the Caſe before mentioned of *Joaſh* and *Athaliah*. Athaliah *perſonally enjoy'd the Crown with all its Dignities*, &c. *And all Places of Power, Truſt*, &c. *were in her hands, and at her diſpoſal*; and this alſo for no leſs a time than ſix years, and in as full and ample a manner, as any Uſurper, or any Rightful King ever enjoy'd them: But for all that the Convocation is ſo far from urging obedience to her, as to God's Authority, that they expreſly juſtifie the Reſiſting, nay, the Slaying her. And this is a clear *Demonſtration*, that by a *thorough Settlement* the Convocation does not mean a full Poſſeſſion of Power merely: For they ſay that when a Government is *throughly ſetled*, it ought to be obeyed, as God's Authority, not only for Fear, but for Conſcience ſake. But they ſay alſo, that when *Athaliah* was fully poſſeſſed of the Throne, ſhe ought not to be obeyed, but to be reſiſted and ſlain. And the Concluſion from theſe Premiſſes is, that to be fully poſſeſſed of the Throne, is not of it ſelf to be ſo *thoroughly ſetled* as to make it God's Authority, and Obedience to become a Duty. So that whatever the Convocation may mean by *thorough ſetled*, it is plain they do not mean by it what our Authour does; and I think there is no difficulty at all, (if Men will look without prejudice,) in underſtanding what they do mean by it.

There are but two ways to underſtand the ſenſe of any Authour; the natural and uſual Conſtruction of the words they expreſs themſelves by, and if there be any obſcurity or doubt in the meaning of ſome Expreſſions, to interpret them by other Expreſſions and Aſſertions in the ſame Authour. Let us try theſe in the Controverſie before us.

I. The words in Controverſie are *Thoroughly ſetled*. And the Queſtion is, what is uſually underſtood by them?

I am pretty confident, That *bare Poſſeſſion*, let it be never ſo full as to the Extent, was never meant by them, with reſpect to *Civil Poſſeſſions*, (and that is the Caſe.) *Settlement* is a Term

very uſual and common in our Law, and moſt Men underſtand the ſenſe of it, and expreſs themſelves by it accordingly. It denotes theſe two things:

1. The Legality of a thing, its being according to Law. *Settlement* and *Eſtabliſhment* are ſynonomous; an illegal Settlement is no Settlement; and nothing in a Government can be ſaid to be ſettled, but what ſtands upon the Foundation of Law. This is the *Baſis* of all Settlements in a Conſtitution, and without this 'tis a Caſtle in the Air, a Building without a Foundation, and ſuch a Settlement as never was heard of.

2. It denotes a quiet and peaceable Poſſeſſion, without Diſturbance from other Claims or Pretenders. A Man can never be ſaid to be *ſetled* in an Eſtate, who hath only an *uſurped Poſſeſſion* of it and when there are other and better Claims and Titles on foot againſt him, and by virtue of which he may be ejected the next Aſſiſes. And to ſay a Man is ſetled in the Poſſeſſion, when the right Owner is actually at Law with him for it, or declares that he will be ſo, ſo ſoon as he has opportunity, or Mony to manage the Suit, is very ſtrange, if any thing in this Age can be ſtrange.

If our Anceſtors ſhould riſe up amongſt us, and we ſhould expreſs our ſelves to them in the moſt obvious Terms of *Allegiance, Sueceſſion, Settlement*; they would no more underſtand our meaning, than if we talked to them in the Language of the *Indies*. We have a Metaphyſical Allegiance, and to ſuit that we muſt now have a Philoſophical Settlement; as if a Man was ſettled in Civil Poſſeſſions juſt as he is ſettled in his Seat, or on Horſe-back: If he can but get his Feet in the Stirrups, and the Reins in his Hands he is ſettled in the Saddle. But ſurely there is ſomewhat more to ſettle a Man in the Poſſeſſion of any Eſtate, and much more of the greateſt Civil Poſſeſſion. At this rate, if a man can but get into the Manour-Houſe, and perſwade the Servants and Tenents to attorn to him, he is as firmly ſetled in the Poſſeſſion of it, as if he had purchaſed it with his Mony, or it had deſcended to him by a thouſand Generations. —— But there is no end of Abſurdities.

There is one word more to be conſidered, and that is *throughly (throughly ſetled.)* And the Convocation is very exact and preciſe, and have uſed that word both in the Chapter, and alſo repeated it in the Canon, laying a great ſtreſs upon it, and as if the whole determination of the buſineſs depended on it; and certainly they meant ſomething by it. Now what is the import of *throughly*, but perfectly, to all intents and purpoſes. The Latines expreſs it *omnino, omni ex parte*; a Government that is *altogether, upon all accounts ſettled.* Put theſe together, *Settlement* always reſpects Right, and a peaceable Poſſeſſion of that Right, without any better Claims or Pretenders; and a *thorough Settlement* is the utmoſt of that: and that is when ſuch a Right is enjoy'd plainly, evidently, without any Contradiction or Objection.

This is the plain meaning of the Words, and therefore the plain meaning of the Convocation: But if there were any obſcurity in them, it will appear by conſulting the Context, and other places, that that was their meaning, and no other; and that is the other way of underſtanding the ſenſe of an Authour.

I have already conſider'd the Inſtance of *Athaliah*, which is as full and direct againſt the Author as any thing can be, and can never be evaded, but by charging the Convocation with being as inconſiderate, and as full of Contradictions as himſelf: But for the farther

ther clearing this Point there is one thing more to be obſerved from that Inſtance, and that is the Reaſon they give, why *Athaliah* was a *Tyrannical uſurper*, and upon what account they juſtifie the Proceedings of *Jehoiada* and the People againſt her; and that is, Joaſh, *their late King's Son being then their only natural Lord and Sovereign*, and which in the Canon they expreſs thus, *the right Heir of that Kingdom being then alive*; plainly intimating, That if the right Heir had not been alive, *Athaliah*, (by what ill means ſoever ſhe attain'd it,) having got Poſſeſſion of the Kingdom, would by that have had a Right to the Government: For a Poſſeſſory Right is ſomething, and where there is no better, that ought to carry it. And the Concluſion from hence is this: That any Perſon (by what means ſoever) gaining the Poſſeſſion of the Throne, if there be no better Claims againſt him, then he hath a Right to it; and then, and not till then, he is *throughly ſetled*. It is agreed on all hands, That a Right to a Government may be acquired, by the death or ceſſion of the Perſons in whom the Right was: And this is the Caſe.

In this Chapter the Convocation mentions ſeveral variations of Government, as to the Forms, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy; and as to the ambitious encroaching of Kings upon their Neighbours, and particularly the four Monarchies, and the King of *Babylon* upon the Jews: All which reſpective Governments, though they were begun by Rebellion, Ambition, and unlawful means, (which the Convocation condemns,) yet afterwards they became lawful Governments, and had *ſuch* a Right to the reſpective Governments they did poſſeſs. And I defie the Authour, or any Man elſe, to ſhew me one ſingle Inſtance (either in this Chapter, or any where in the whole Book,) of any Government, That the Convocation requires or juſtifies Allegiance to be paid to it, but what had firſt acquired ſuch a Right. And if they cannot, as I am pretty well aſſured they cannot, why do they make ſuch a Pother about two words, and diſingenuouſly and unworthily interpret them, both contrary to their common and uſual meaning, and contrary to the whole Doctrine, and every Inſtance in the whole Book.

This was the Caſe of the *Babylonian*, *Perſian*, *Macedonian*, and *Roman* Governments over the Jews; but this was not the Caſe of *Athaliah* and *Antiochus Epiphanes*; and therefore the Convocation requires Submiſſion to *theſe*, but juſtifies the Reſiſtance of *theſe*.

This Propoſition in the Convocation is univerſal, *That whatever Government is throughly ſetled, ought to be obeyed*. And if it appears in all and every one of the Inſtances they give of Government, to which they ſay Obedience is due, that theſe Governments had ſuch a *Right*; and if it appears likewiſe, that in every one of theſe Inſtances they give of Government, where there was not *ſuch* a Right, (tho never ſo full Poſſeſſion of Power,) that they may be reſiſted: Then it plainly follows, that as by being *throughly ſetled*, they do not mean bare Poſſeſſion of Power, (tho it be never ſo full,) ſo by it they do mean, and can mean nothing elſe than the Acquiſition of *ſuch* a Right. And this I take to be fair Reaſoning, for every Authour is the beſt Interpreter of his own ſenſe. And when the Convocation gives us a general Rule about Obedience to Government, what better way is there to underſtand their meaning, than to apply our ſelves to their particular Inſtances, (which in all Caſes explain and prove general Rules?) And if they give us Inſtances of ſome Governments, where was Poſſeſſion and no Right, and juſtifie the Reſiſtance of ſuch Governments, and if they give us

Inſtances of other Governments where was both Poſſeſſion and Right, and ſay they ought to be Obeyed: It is plain the difference only lies between *Right* and no *Right*; and they mean where there is Poſſeſſion of Government and no Right, it is *not* thoroughly ſetled, and may be reſiſted; and where is Poſſeſſion and Right it is thoroughly ſetled, and ought to be obeyed. And let thoſe Gentlemen who talk ſo much of a *plenary Poſſeſſion without Right* try if they can find any one Inſtance in the whole Convocation Book, that will run parallel with the Doctrines they teach, and the Interpretations they make. For my part I know but two, (*Athaliah* and *Antiochus*,) and both which the Convocation condemns; all the reſt (and which the Convocation approves) they had acquired a Right to the reſpective Governments. And it is an unaccountable Method of Interpretation to pick out two words from a Book, and put a Senſe on them directly contrary to all Inſtances in that Book.

But that this and no other is their meaning of a Government being *thoroughly ſetled*, is farther evident from the Proof the Convocation brings of this Doctrine in this Chapter: For after that they had aſſerted that a Government, (by what ill means ſoever attain'd,) after it is *thoroughly ſettled* ought to be obey'd. For the Proof and Confirmation of this Aſſertion they immediately mention the *Iſraelites* not Rebelling againſt the Kings of *Egypt*, tho' oppreſſed, *&c.* and the Jews, when in Subjection to the Kings of *Babylon*, are condemn'd by the Prophet *Jeremy* for rebelling againſt them by the Inſtigation of falſe Prophets, *&c.* Now I ſuppoſe no Man will deny but the Convocation produc'd thoſe as a full and direct Proof of their Aſſertions (for they add no other,) and the connexion is this: A Government, though obtain'd by ill means, when throughly ſetled, is to be obeyed; for that the *Iſraelites* obey'd the Kings of *Egypt*, and the Jews in Captivity did the ſame to the Kings of *Babylon*. And then we have a clear account what they mean by a Government *throughly ſetled*, *i. e.* ſuch a Government as was the *Egyptian* over the *Iſraelites*, the *Babylonian* over the Jews: And each of theſe had an undoubted Right to their reſpective Governments. Such a Right I mean as that we are now ſpeaking of by Death, Ceſſion or Preſcription; and then it neceſſarily follows, that they mean a Government is then only *throughly ſetled* when ſuch a Right is acquired, otherwiſe theſe Inſtances, (which the Convocation brings to prove and illuſtrate it) inſtead of confirming deſtroys their main Aſſertion, and it would ſtand thus: In the Aſſertion it would be Poſſeſſion *without Right* is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed; but in the proof Poſſeſſion *with Right* is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed.

The Sum of this Matter is this: There are ſeveral ways of attaining a Right to a Government, beſides Lineal Deſcent, as by the Death or Submiſſion of thoſe in whom the Right was joyned with the Conſent and Submiſſion of the People; and alſo a long undiſturbed Poſſeſſion, called Preſcription. Now all Mankind are agreed, That a Right to a Government by theſe ways, may be attained; and tho the ways that are uſed to attain that Right, are always unjuſt, (as the Convocation ſays by Ambition, Rebellion, *&c.*) Yet when that Right is attained, theſe Governments reſpectively are then lawful Government, and ought to be obeyed. Upon this Foot moſt, if not all the Governments in the World do now ſtand, and the Convocation Book (as the Title expreſſes) concerns the Government of the Kingdoms of the whole World. And agreeably to that they were

were obliged to Diſcourſe of all the Rights of Government, which they do under two Heads or *Claſſes*. Such Rights of Government as are attained by juſt ways; and ſuch Rights as are attained by unjuſt ways: And having before ſpoken of thoſe Rights that are juſtly attained, as by God's expreſs Nomination and Lineal Deſcent, they now in this Chapter come to diſcourſe of thoſe Rights which are attained by unjuſt ways, as by Rebellion of Subjects, Ambition, and Greedineſs of Encroaching Kings. But leſt it ſhould be thought that the wicked ways of attaining this Right was a prejudice to the Right it ſelf, and People from thence ſhould take occaſion to Rebel and diſturb all the Governours of the World, becauſe they could not ſhew an expreſs Order from God, or derive the Pedigree of their Government from *Adam* to *Noah*; to prevent the terrible Confuſions that ſuch a Notion would make in the World, they ſay that the wicked ways of attaining it, or the wickedneſs of the Perſons that have it, is no Impeachment of the Right it ſelf; but when it is attained, it is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed, as the *Iſraelites* obeyed *Pharaoh*, and as the *Jews* obeyed *Nebuchadnezzar*.

This is the plain and obvious ſenſe of this Chapter, this the nature of the Thing, this their Method led them to, and this is agreeable to all the Inſtances they give us of Government, and this is ſuitable to all the Doctrines which they teach about it.

Now therefore I ſhall further ſhew the Abſurdity of this Author's Interpretation in the three following Particulars:

I. It is inconſiſtent with the main and fundamental Doctrine delivered in the Book.

II. It reproaches the Worthies of the Church of *England*, who ſuffered between the Years 42. and 60.

III. It maintains an abſurd, unreaſonable, and ungodly Doctrine.

1. Such an Interpretation is inconſiſtent with the main and fundamental Doctrines of the Convocation Book.

I have already ſhewed it is inconſiſtent with all the Inſtances they give, and I ſhall now ſhew that it is inconſiſtent with the fundamental Doctrines they teach.

The principal Doctrines of the Convocation-Book are *Paſſive Obedience* and *Nonreſiſtance*, and the whole Deſign of it ſeems to be, (that I mean that concerns the Civil Government,) to make it good, That Subjects are bound to obey their lawful Governors, and upon no account whatſoever to reſiſt them: This, I ſay, is their fundamental Doctrine, and whatever they deliver, it hath ſome way or other a reference to it; and therefore it is but neceſſary to interpret their Expreſſions in ſuch a ſenſe as may beſt ſuit with their main Deſign. And now let us try which Interpretation of a *Thorough Settlement* beſt agrees with *Paſſive Obedience*, and *That* we are in Juſtice bound to believe to be the ſenſe of the Convocation.

Now to ſay a Government is *thoroughly ſettled*, when it hath acquired a Right, by a long Tract of uninterrupted Poſſeſſion, or by the utter Deſtruction, or Submiſſion, of the Right Heirs; this does not in the leaſt interfere with the Doctrine of *Paſſive Obedience*, but is conſonant to it, and to every other Doctrine and Expreſſion in the whole Book. But for our Authour's Interpretation, when a Perſon hath got full Poſſeſſion of Power, and the Lawful King

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is alive, and ſo far from ſubmitting, that he actually conteſts his Right, and demands the Allegiance of his Subjects in order to it: In ſuch a Caſe, to ſay that they muſt quit their lawful King, become Subjects to the Poſſeſſor, transfer all their Allegiance and Duty to him, do all they can to eſtabliſh him in the Poſſeſſion, and as much to keep the other out, become irreconcileable and mortal Enemies to him, and if need be to fight againſt and kill him, (for all theſe neceſſarily follow from that Notion.) Now how the Author will *Demonſtrate* this to be Paſſive Obedience, or reconcile it to it, is not for me to comprehend. The Author hath offered at as ſtrange things as that: For if any one of a Family, though never ſo many degrees off, and him ſet up by the People too, be Succeſſion in a Hereditary Monarchy. If forceable Poſſeſſion be a *thorough Settlement*; then for any thing I know, fighting againſt and killing a Rightful King, even when we acknowledg the Right to be in him, may be Paſſive Obedience. And if this be the Caſe, I have nothing to do but to beg of God to keep me in my Senſes.

And that is abundantly ſufficient to prevent impoſing on by ſuch Arguments, the Author if he pleaſes may call white black, and heat cold: but if he do, ſure he expects not to convince others of it, nor eaſily perſuade them he believes it himſelf.

But then if fighting againſt and killing a King we have ſworn Allegiance to, be not Paſſive Obedience, then by a Government throughly ſettled, the Convocation does not mean bare Poſſeſſion of Power.

2. This Interpretation reproaches thoſe Worthies of the Church of *England*, who ſuffered between the Years 42, and 60.

A very few Years ſince it would have been thought a high Degree of Madneſs for a Church of *England* Man to have doubted, who (in the late Times) acted moſt agreeably to the Principles of that Church in the Point of Allegiance and Government, either Archbiſhop *Juxton*, Biſhop *Cozens*, Biſhop *Gunning*, &c. or *Hugh Peters*, Dr. *Owen*, or *John Goodwyn*. But now our Author hath clearly determined it for *Hugh*, and his Brethren, and againſt the Biſhops. Now as ridiculous as this is, it is certainly the Caſe; for if the Author be right, all theſe Reverend and Excellent Men who were undone for their Loyalty, acted ignorantly or unſincerely; and thoſe only who followed the ſeveral Revolutions, and adhered to them againſt the King, are the Men that acted according to the Principles of the Church of *England*; nay, even the *Regicides* themſelves will put in for Church of *England* Men too; and (which is the ſtrangeſt thing of all) even in point of Allegiance and Government. For that Government that appointed the High Court of Juſtice, had a full Poſſeſſion of Power, and *all Places of Truſt*, &c. *were in their Hands, and at their diſpoſal.* And by reaſon of that they had a ſufficient Authority, (even God's) by Commiſſion from which they acted; and then all their Allegiance was juſtly transferred from the King to them: By Virtue of which they did but their Duty, but in acting under ſuch a Commiſſion from their Governors, and alſo in purſuing to death the Enemies and Competitors of that Government whoſe Subjects they were, and whoſe Security and Eſtabliſhment they were bound to promote.

And is this no prejudice to this Interpretation? Muſt we part with our Senſes, as well as our Principles? Is it poſſible for any Man to believe that

that *John Goodwyn* was a better Church of *England* Man, in Point of Allegiance and Government, than Doctor *Hammond*? or that the Principles of the Church of *England* justifie the Murther of *Charles* the first? I do not know of what weight this may be with the Authour; but any Man, who had any respect for the Church of *England*, would have been a little cautious how he had fastened such a Sense upon the Words of such a Venerable Convocation, as should justifie the most execrable Villany under the Sun, and reproach as great and worthy Men as ever were Members of it, and some of them probably Members of this Convocation, and condemn them in those very Instances which were the highest Evidences of their Vertues and Sincerity, and upon account of which their Names and Memories will always be precious; and one single Example of such Men is of more value with all good Men, than that of a thousand Weather-Cock Divines, who can turn themselves and their Principles as there is occasion, and by the help of *Publick Good*, and a *Jesuitical* Distinction or two, can make them suit with any Power in the World.

Now Men (if they have a mind to it) may defend *Hugh Peters*, *Bradshaw*, and the *High Court of Justice*, and condemn their Judges and Juries for Murthering honest Men, who did but their Duty. They may, if they will, applaud the Practices of *Nye*, *Marshall* and *Milton*, and dislike those of the Glorious Sufferers for their King and their Consciences. And to bring for Principles of the Church of *England* that will do all this, is as ridiculous as it is shameless and impudent.

3. This Interpretation maintains an absurd, unreasonable, ungodly Doctrine, and that is, *That the Permission of Providence is a Rule of Practice, and a sufficient Warrant to act contrary to the Rules of Right and Justice amongst Men.* This does not only naturally follow from this Interpretation, but the Authour asserts the same almost in so many Words: For going about to prove that the Revolution is God's doing, he tells us, (in Page 14, *&c.*) *That God's Providence in permitting, is a sufficient Indication of his Will and Pleasure, as to the Event.* And (saith he) *since Prophecy hath ceased sure I am, that nothing but Providence is vocal to us.* I wonder what the Authour thinks of Scripture, and Right, and Laws among Men; sure these are as *vocal* as Providence, and we are bound to make them the Rule of our Practices, and are so directed by God himself: But we have no Direction or Warrant to act by any Methods of Providence contrary to them. The Authour goes on, *Such strong Arguments may we produce from it, as will not with Ease or Ridicule be eluded.* But for all that, I must tell our Authour, That his Opinion as it is foolish, so it deserves to be laughed at; but as 'tis impious, to be execrated and abominated, as tending to the destruction of all Righteousness, and even of Humane Society: For if Men must direct their Lives not by fixed and stated Rules, but by God's Permissions and Providential Occurrences; we should soon have a Mad World on't, and Robbery, Rapine, Fraud and Oppression would be more to be observed than (nay against) Right, and Law, and even Scripture it self. But however the Authour is so fond of his Notion, That he tells us, *He can't restrain his Pen from the moving of this Query: Whether the Manifest Interpositions of a Gracious Providence, that tends to the promoting of God's Honour, and to the Establish-*

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ment of his Church, be not to us (now that Prophecy is ceas'd) a Juſtifiable Ground for any rational Man to act upon? i. e. againſt known Laws, and the engagement of our Oaths (for otherwiſe it is not to the Authour's Purpoſe;) and then with great Confidence adds, *I think this will hardly be denyed.* What doth the Authour mean? or where does he live? *Hardly be denyed?* Why it has been denyed a Thouſand times over, and there is ſcarcely a Sermon that treats any thing of Providence, but denies it; and I do deny it, and the Authour ſhall ſee what Grounds I have for it: But I obſerve from the Authour's Query,

1. That he takes too much upon him to determine the Interpoſition of Providence, as tending to God's Honour, *and Eſtabliſhment of his Church*, (in the ſenſe he would have it:) For the Authour may know, if he pleaſe, That God's Honour is as much, and generally more promoted by the Patience and ſufferings of his People, than by their external Proſperity; eſpecially if that Proſperity be gain'd, or endeavoured to be gain'd, by undue means: It is not for the Honour of God to carve for our ſelves, to take ſuch courſes to ſecure us as he does not allow of, and to ſet up his Providence in contradiction to his Laws. And the Conſtancy and Fidelity of Men, and eſpecially of the Clergy, to their Principles, tends more to the Honour of Religion, and more recommends it to the World, than to change and turn them to all Times and Seaſons; and the Church is better eſtabliſhed upon the Foundation of Truth and Juſtice, than upon any worldly Power; or when ſhe deſerts theſe, and makes a Rule of Divine Permiſſions. The Authour is very bold with Providence, and not only makes the ſecret Things of God a Rule for common Behaviour, but determines them to what end he pleaſeth. There is no doubt but that God will be glorified in all his Proceedings; but whether by ſuch Interpoſitions of his Providence, he will bring Glory to himſelf, by the Patience and Fidelity of his Servants, or any other way, is more than the Authour can know, and he muſt be very aſſuming, if he undertakes to determine.

2. As to the Authour's main Query, whether the Interpoſitions of Providence be not a juſtifiable Ground for a reaſonable Man to act upon, let him anſwer it himſelf in this other Query: Whether, if a poor Man hath ſtoln his Neighbour's Purſe, or (which is nearer to our Authour) if a Thief hath ſtollen it, and given it him, may he keep it, though he knows it is ſtollen, and from whom? He is poſſeſſed of it by Providence, he did not ſteal it himſelf, and it is very gratious to him to ſupply the needs of himſelf and his poor Family. In ſuch a Caſe I ask, may he honeſtly keep it? I ſuppoſe our Authour will ſay No, and the Reaſon is, becauſe he can't *lawfully* do it. So then it is not the Interpoſition of Providence, but the Lawfulneſs of the thing *that is the juſtifiable Ground for a rational Man to act upon.*

But does not the Scripture and the Convocation-Book ſay, That God is the Univerſal Monarch of the World, that he ſets up and pulls down Kings, altereth, beſtoweth and transferreth Kingdoms?

Very true? and does not the ſame Scripture ſay, That God is the Lord of all private Mens Eſtates, as well as of Kingdoms, and that he exalteth and depreſſeth, that he maketh Rich and Poor, and altereth their Stations

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and conditions, as ſeems beſt to the Divine Wiſdom.

And is it not very foul to argue from hence? Therefore if any Man by the Permiſſion of Providence, can corruptly, fraudulently or forcibly, get his Neighbour's Goods or Eſtate into his Poſſeſſion; why, he muſt have them: The Laws and Judges, and all Men elſe, muſt do what they can to keep him in Poſſeſſion; for it is God's Will it ſhould be ſo: *For* (ſaith our Authour, Pag. 14.) *God's Providence in permitting, is a ſufficient Indication of his Will and Pleaſure, as to the Event.* The Iſraelites, by God's expreſs direction ſpoiled the *Egyptians*; and therefore if any Man ſpoil his Neighbour and get his Money or Jewels into his Hands, they are all his own: For our Authour is very *ſure, ſince Prophecy hath ceaſed, Providence is only vocal to us; and he can from thence produce ſuch ſtrong Arguments, as will not with eaſe be eluded.* And is not this pure Caſuiſtical Divinity, and admirably fitted to promote Righteouſneſs and Juſtice in the World? But if this hold not good in private Eſtates, I would fain have the Authour ſhew me a Reaſon why it does in Kingdoms? God hath the ſame Propriety, his Providence is the ſame, and the general Principles and Accounts of God's Proceedings in Scripture are all one: And therefore if an Argument from Providence be not good with reſpect to private Eſtates, neither is it with reſpect to Governments; and Right, and not Providence, muſt govern us in one Caſe, as well as the other.

The State of this Matter is plainly this: Where we are free, we may act upon the Interpoſitions of Providence, as we ſee Occaſion; but where we are already bound up by Oaths and Laws, their Obligation will hold us againſt all Providences, (nakedly and barely conſidered,) and we cannot be diſcharged of them, till God by his Providence hath ſo ordered and diſpoſed Matters, as we may lawfully act without the Breach and Violation of them. When a Government is altered, and ſo as to acquire a Right to the Subjects Allegiance, in the forementioned ways of Death, Ceſſion, *&c.*) It is certain this comes by Providence, (and therefore juſtly and fitly aſcribed to it:) But then the Immediate Reaſon and Ground of Submiſſion is not the Permiſſion or Providence of God merely; but Providence proceeding ſo far, as to open a way that it may be done lawfully, and without prejudice to other Ties: In this Senſe, we may follow the Direction of Providence, and become Subjects to a Government that Providence ſhall ſo ſet up. But this Senſe will not ſerve our Authour's turn, and yet it is the ſame that he delivereth, though he doth not know it. He tells us in Page 15. That, *without the Interpoſitions of Providence, Predictions themſelves are not raſhly to be executed*; *i. e.* till Providence hath ſo cleared the way, as to make it lawful to put them in Execution.

A little before, he quotes a Paſſage out of the Convocation-Book, *p.* 47. *That the Succeſs of Divine Benedictions* (which afterwards he calls *Predictions*, as if *Benedictions* and *Predictions* were all one,) *are to be left to the Diſpoſition of God's Heavenly Providence.*

Now this Paſſage in the Convocation refers to *Samuel*'s Anointing *David* King, intimating thereby, that *Samuel* did not depoſe *Saul*, nor put *David* upon undue means to gain the Crown, but left the Accompliſhment of it to God's Providence, to clear and open a way for him, that he might lawfully take it. And it is plain ſo *David* underſtood it; for though he

he was anointed King by God's expreſs Commandment, (and that is ſomewhat more than by Providence,) yet that did not tempt him to act againſt his known Duty: And though God put *Saul* twice into his Power, 1 Sam. 24. 3. & 26. 8. 9. he did not think *that Providence a juſtifiable Ground to act upon*, and to take that Advantage to make himſelf King, (and yet I take it, that was a great deal more than *Permiſſion.*) And *David*'s Followers urge it home, *And the men of* David *ſaid unto him, behold the day which the Lord ſaid unto thee, behold! I will give thine Enemy into thine hand, that thou mayeſt do to him as ſhall ſeem good unto thee,* 1 Sam. 4. 4. And *Abiſhai* alſo ſaid to *David, God hath delivered thine Enemy into thine hand this day: now therefore let me ſmite him.* God had given his Enemy that purſued his Life into his hands, and here was a *gracious Providence to act upon*; God made him a Promiſe, and ſeemed to point out this as a means to accompliſh it; and it muſt be confeſſed, this is as plauſible a Caſe as can be put. But *David* knew his Duty better, and though the Text expreſſes, and *David* owns, that it was from God, and that God did it, and that is by an active and not barely permiſſive Providence; yet he knew that was no Warrant for him to act againſt any Branch of his Legal Duty, but ſays expreſly, *who can ſtretch forth his hand againſt the Lords Anointed, and be guiltleſs?* It was againſt the Law to ſtretch forth his hand againſt the King, and no Interpoſitions of Providence, would make that Fact innocent; he followed Providence as far as he lawfully might, and the Laws of the Kingdom permitted, but he durſt not act upon it in Contradiction to them; and therefore he ſays to *Abiſhai* that would have killed *Saul*, v. 10. *The Lord ſhall ſmite him, or his day ſhall come to die, or he ſhall deſcend into Battel and periſh*; that is, he left it to God's Providence, ſo to order and diſpoſe of Things, and to bring it about in ſuch a manner, as he might take the Crown without the Violation of any Duty that he owed, or of any former Engagement he had made to King *Saul*. Now when Providence proceeds in this manner, and ſo to make a clear paſſage to Submiſſion; then, and then only it is a juſtifiable Ground to act upon. But to talk of Divine Permiſſions, as a ſufficient Warrant to juſtifie our Acting againſt Common Right, and known Laws, and the ſtrongeſt Obligations, is certainly one of the wildeſt Aſſertions in the World.

I ſhall end this with the plain Judgment of Doctor *Stillingfleet* in this matter: *The great Revolutions of Government are attributed to the particular Providence of God; God is the Judge, he pulleth down one, and ſetteth up another; which doth not found any Right of Dominion, (which ſome ſanſied, 'till the Argument from Providence was returned with greater force upon themſelves;) but it ſhews that when God pleaſes to make uſe of Perſons or Nations, as the Scourges in his Hand to puniſh a People with, He gives them Succeſs above their Hopes or Expectations: But that Succeſs gives them no Right.* Serm. before the Commons Nov. 13. 1691. 3d Edit.

For a Concluſion I ſhall add one Thing more, and which of it ſelf alone is ſufficient to ſhew the Folly of our Authour's Interpretation, and that is, That (beſide the many Abſurdities and Contradictions that attend it,) it is contrary to the expreſs Doctrine and Declaration of the Members of that Convocation. Now I take it for granted, that they underſtood the Senſe of the *Convocation* a little

a little better than our Authour. I take it likewiſe for granted, That what they had determined for Doctrine in a publick and ſolemn Way, and in Convocation, they would neither contradict, nor yet deliver the clean contrary to their particular Writings. But then it will follow, that our Authour's Interpretation, and the Doctrine built on it is a new Invention, and never heard of in the Church of *England*, till very lately. Biſhop *Andrews*, a very Eminent and Learned Member of that Convocation, in a Sermon preached before the King, but three Years after the ending of it, upon theſe Words, *Per me Reges regnant*, By me Kings reign, (*Prov.* 8 15.) tells us, That the act *Regnant* is twofold; *Some are* Reges, *Kings*; *and yet reign not*, (*as* True Heirs *defeated*,) *and ſome reign, and are no Kings*, (*as do all* Uſurpers *on the Throne*, per Fas Neſáſque,) *always one thing it is to be King, another to reign*; Joaſh *was true King all thoſe ſix years he reigned not*; Athaliah *reigned all thoſe ſix years, yet true Queen ſhe never was any. Of ſuch God ſaith*, Hoſ. 8. 9. Regnaverunt, ſed non à me. *Why? For* per me Reges regnant, *By me Kings reign; Kings of lawful and true Deſcent, they reign by me. Theſe were none ſuch, ſo they reigned without any* per, *from me*; *but when theſe meet, and they that be* Reges de Jure, regnant de Facto, *then it is as it ſhould be, and* per me *it is that they ſo meet.*

On *Nov.* 5. 1613. p. 939. 2d. Edit. 1631.

Biſhop *Buckeridge*, Biſhop of *Rocheſter*, (in his Book written in the Defence of *Barclay*, which Book was probably written ſome part of it in the time of this Convocation, for it is a very Elaborate Work, and was Printed 1614.) layeth this down as a general Doctrine: *There is a great difference between a Tyrant reigning by a lawful Title, and a Tyrant without Right and Title, and invading the Kingdom by force. If a lawful King exerciſe Tyranny, he cannot be compelled by the Biſhops, or Nobles, or People*, &c. *for ſuch a Tyrant being in the Throne by a juſt Title, is ordained of God, and he who reſiſts him, reſiſts the Ordinance of God: But if any Man ſnatcheth the Kingdom by Force and Tyranny, he is not a King, but an Enemy, and it is lawful for any of the People to do the ſame to him, as they may do to an Enemy.* This is plain enough, but yet there is more in that Chapter no leſs obſervable. *Bellarmine* had objected the *Quiet Poſſeſſion* of *Athaliah* for ſix years. To which the Biſhop anſwers, *How quiet ſoever it was, it was violent, (for ſhe was guarded with Soldiers.) But what are ſix years to make a good Title of Preſcription, and Poſſeſſion, which, according to* Gregory Tholoanus, *ought to be the Poſſeſſion of an hundred years or more*; *and what are ſix years no an hundred? Athaliah therefore had not acquired a Right to the Crown, neither by the Conſent of the People, nor by the Preſcription of ſix Years, but being a mere uſurper, and no Queen, ſhe might be depoſed.* And ſo we have not only the Senſe of this Right Reverend Learned Prelate, that an uſurped Poſſeſſion of the Crown cannot Claim our Allegiance, but alſo we have his Senſe of a *thorough Settlement* (in one kind,) and that is when a Right to the Government is acquired by a Preſcription, and that is a long and uninterrupted Poſſeſſion joyned with the Conſent of the People. And ſo it follows a little after, when in anſwer to *Bellarmine's* Objecting other Governments,

Diſpar vero eſt ratio Tyranni ligitimo jure regnantis, & Tyranno ſine jure & titulo Regnum per Vim & Tyrannidem occupantis, &c. Roſſin. *in rebus Temp. de Poteſtate Papæ*, p. 919.

'At ſex annos quiete regnavit, & poſſeſſio ita eſt quieta, &c. p. 911.

ments, which in their beginnings were Violent and Tyrannical, but afterwards became lawful, as that of the *Cæsars*, the *Goths*, and *Lombards*, he says, That *Governments acquired by the right of war, by Prescription they usually become lawful.* But then by Prescription it is plain he does not mean a quiet Possession of six, nor many more Years, but when thereby a *Right* to the Government is acquired; and consequently our Author's full Possession of Dignities, Prerogatives, &c. to which our Allegiance is due, is a Notion that before now never saw Light among the true Sons of the Church of *England*.

Imperia jure Belli acquisita, Temporis Præscriptione legitimè fieri solent. *Ibid.*

To these Right Reverend Prelates I crave leave to add a worthy and learned Author, who also wrote many learned Tracts about these times, and he is Doctor *Jackson*, who hath fully declared his own and the Church of *England*'s Judgment in this very Point. He puts these two Questions: *How far any Man which without Title doth take upon him, and by Fraud and Violence gets opportunity to exercise Royal Authority over them may be resisted? The second is: whether He that by just Title is invested with Royal Power may be resisted in the unjust and Tyrannical Exercises of it?*

P. 960. 3 T. last Edit.

To these two Questions the Answer hath been long since given, by some Moral Philosophers, and approved of by best Divines.

1. *He who is a mere usurper, or a Tyrant by Title, may be resisted by Violence, even to Deposition, or Death, albeit he happens to exercise his Power with such Moderation as would become a just and lawful King. He that is a King, or supreme Magistrate, by just and lawful Title, may not be thus resisted, albeit he exercise his Power Tyrannically; touching the former it is a Truth unquestionable, That a Tyrant by Title, or a mere usurper of supreme Power, or an Intruder into the Office Royal, may be resisted, without resisting the Ordinance of God, and the Reason is plain; for that he could never usurp or continue his Power otherwise than by resisting some higher Powers, or by resisting the Ordinance of God.* And among others he Instances, *In case he usurps or exercises Royal Authority over such as have been formerly governed by Royal Succession, he openly resists Power much higher than his own, whether this Power be yet actually annex'd to some known Persons that have Right or Titles to the Kingdom by Succession, or not.* 'Tis true, he says this Resistance may not be made by every body; but he says it likewise with this Qualification, *Save in the Right and Interest of the Right Heir, or by his Commission and Command.*

And the same he says a little after, (*Page* 968.) when he answers to the Example of *Jehoiada*'s deposing of *Athaliah*, urged by the Papists for the Power of the Pope to depose Kings. *The Power Royal or Supreme was by Right annexed to the Infant Prince, as being annexed to the Infant Prince, as being next Heir; and Jehoiada deposed her who by Force and Violence had usurped the Royal Scepter. Is it then all one in these Mens Divinity, for a Subject or Peer of any Realm to stand for the Right of his Liege Lord; and for the ancient Liberties of his Native Country against a Stranger, or usurper? And for a Stranger no Native Member of this or the like Christian Commonweal, to thrown down the lawful King from his Throne? or to authorise his Subjects or others to do to him, as Jehoiada did to Athaliah? And to bring in a Stranger or Alien, as he to cast out a Stranger or Usurper.*

The Testimonies are clear enough of the Doctrine that was own'd by the Convocation, and by that Age, and I could add many more, particularly of Bishop

Biſhop *Merton*, who not only taught but practiſed this Doctrine, being himſelf a Sufferer under the Revolution begun in 42. and of Doctor *Field*, then Dean of *Worceſter*, and many others, who have ſaid the ſame; but this would be to write a New *Hiſtory of Paſſive Obedience*, And I think I may challenge our Author or any Man elſe, to ſhew me one ſingle Inſtance, not only of any Member of that Convocation, but of any approved Author of the Church of *England*, and of that, or any other Age, but (either diſcourſing *ex profeſſo* of Uſurpation, or *in tranſitu* ſpeaking of it,) what hath delivered always the very ſame Doctrine.

The Author (in ridiculous Cant) tells us in Page 1, 2. *Since Biſhops* Overall's *Convocation-Book we plead Reaſon and Authority.* But I tell him in his own Language, That we have not only got a whole Convocation of unprejudiced and learned Men, but the ſame unprejudiced and learned Men out of Convocation, and all the learned Men of that Age, and of all others of the Church of *England*, who were removed from any Temptations, and the fitteſt and moſt fair Judges to determine, that have unanimouſly and expreſly condemned the Notions and Aſſertions of our Author, and of all that hold the ſame.

I conclude with one Requeſt to our Author, That when the next fit of Demonſtrations takes him, he will be pleaſed to demonſtrate this ſame thing from the *Hiſtory of Paſſive Obedience*; and to encourage him, I can aſſure him, That Obedience and Submiſſion, *&c.* will be as eaſily demonſtrated from the *Hiſtory of Paſſive Obedience*, as from *Biſhop* Overall's *Convocation-Book*.

F I N I S.

POSTSCRIPT.

SInce the finiſhing of this, Doctor *Sherlock* hath publiſh'd the Reaſons that induced him to take the Oath; He proceeds upon the ſame Grounds with this Authour, and what is here ſaid (as to the main) is equally of Force againſt both, and will ſerve to vindicate the *Convocation*-Book, as well from the falſe Interpretation of the Dr. as of the Author. I ſhall not now ſtand (not does it concern my preſent Purpoſe) to Examine all the Arguments the Dr. makes uſe of, (but that will be done in due time:) But I ſhall fully further Conſider, what he urges from the Convocation, and is not mentioned by the Author; and ſhall alſo Clear theſe Aſſertions deliver'd in the Anſwer, from ſuch things as may be rais'd in Objection to them, from the Dr's Book. And in Examining theſe, I ſhall have Occaſion to Conſider, and ſhall thereby ſhew the Weakneſs of the Fundamental Principles that he proceeds upon. I obſerve then:

1. That the Interpretation of the Words of the Convocation in both, is the very ſame: But there is ſome Difference as to the manner of propoſing it. The Author is doubtful and modeſt; *He cannot but conceive, and with Submiſſion*, That a Government is ſetled, *when the whole Adminiſtration of Affairs, and all Places of Truſt*, &c. *are in the Hands of the Prince.* But the Dr. is very confident of it, it is as plain, *as every Body can ſee it*; and (ſaith he) *If this be not a ſetled Government, I deſpair of ever knowing what it is.* Now it muſt be remembred, that the Dr. owns, that in this Book he hath renounced one of his Principles, and the whole Book is an Evidence, and an Acknowledgment, that he hath been very much miſtaken, and hath continued a great while under the Power of thoſe Miſtakes. And ſo ſoon, and in the ſame Book to be again ſo full of Aſſurance, and to challenge People to Anſwer him! The Principle that he now renounceth, yea, and all the Principles he now diſputes againſt, (though he calls it ſoftly *Declaring his own Thoughts*) yet he did aſſert with as much Peremptorineſs as any thing in this new Book: And why ſhould he then deſpair of knowing any other Notion of a ſetled Government, beſides his own; perhaps, (if no body could inform him) the Dr. hereafter might himſelf find out another Notion of it; for what hath been, may be: In the mean time, there is another Notion of it deliver'd above, and which is more agreeable to the Rules of Truth and Juſtice, and to the common Acceptation of theſe Words among Men. And let the Dr. ſhew me any one Approved *Lawyer*, or *Civilian* (who are ſuppoſed to ſpeak the moſt properly in ſuch Matters) or any Hiſtorian that ever deliver'd ſuch a Senſe of thoſe Words, or that ever affirm'd, or in a meer Narratory way, declar'd, That an Uſurped Poſſeſſion was a *Thorough Settlement*, or any Settlement at all, when there was a Rightful and Legal Title

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tle in being againſt it, and that Title actually conteſting. Let him ſhew me (in the particular inſtance) any approved Author that ever ſaid, That *Tyrannus ſine Titulo*, (as is the Caſe the Dr. puts in his Book) was a Government throughly ſettled, or any true Government at all. The Dr. expreſly aſſerts, *That the Providence of God alters no Legal Rights, nor forbids thoſe who are diſpoſſeſſed of them, to Recover their Right when they can*; which (by the way) is a ſtrange Doctrine: For why does not God's Authority in the Poſſeſſor (if he have it) bind the Diſpoſſeſſed King as well as the People? and it is ſomewhat ſtrange that when God diveſts a King of his Government, he has ſtill a Right to it, and may juſtly recover it: This tends mightily to the Peace of Societies, (one of the Drs. Arguments) the Caſe of the Kings the Convocation ſpeaks of as diſpoſſeſſed by God was quite otherwiſe, they had no Right left, as when *Jehu* was Anointed, *Joram* became his Subject. But it muſt be confeſſed thoſe Wiſe Men never thought of the Drs. Hypotheſis and new Notions: But to the purpoſe, the diſpoſſeſſed King according to the Dr. hath ſtill a Legal Right, and by virtue of which he may recover his Throne. Then I ſay, ſo long as the Caſe is ſo, and the Pretentions to Right ſtill in diſpute, the contrary Government can never be ſaid to be throughly ſetled; when there is a proſecution, but of a pretended Right, it cannot fairly be ſaid, that ſuch a Poſſeſſion is *throughly* ſetled, but when there is a plain, viſible and indiſputable Legal Right againſt a Poſſeſſor, and that Right actually proſecuted, in ſuch a caſe, to call bare Poſſeſſion a *thorough Settlement*, is one of the ſtrangeſt things in the World; and if that be a Settlement, all the World have hitherto been miſtaken about it, and we are beholden to the Dr. for his new Diſcovery of a Settlement. As for his new Doctrine about Providence,

2. The Dr. ſays, that the Convocation ſpeaks of the Subjection of the *Iſraelites* to the *Moabites* and *Aramites*, and to the Kings of *Ægypt*, and *Babylon*, as their duty, and that they were bound to it, and from thence concludes the Senſe of the Convocation to be, That Princes who have no Legal Right may have Gods Authority, and ought to be obey'd. For, ſaith he, the *Moabites* and *Aramites* never could have a Legal Right to the Government of *Iſrael*, and the *Ægyptian* and *Babyloniſh* Kings never had any Legal Right: Now but three Pages off, the Dr. tells us, *That the Submiſſion of the Prince may be thought neceſſary to transfer a Legal Right*; and then all theſe Governments had a Legal Right to the Government of *Iſrael*: As to *Babylon*, the Dr. tells us, there was God's expreſs Command for their Submiſſion, and *Nebuchadnezzar* carried the Princes captive with him, and I think there is no great doubt of their Submiſſion, and eſpecially if they were ſenſible that God commanded it. As to *Ægypt*, what Government the *Jews* had then among them does not appear; but whatever Government they had, Or, whoever they had for their Governours, it is plain they ſubmitted to the Kings of *Ægypt*, as well as all the People; and the Convocation expreſly affirms they did ſo. And the Caſe is the ſame with reſpect to the *Moabites* and *Aramites*, whatever Governours they had, they and the People ſubmitted; and the Convocation is as expreſs as can be, *They knew it was not Lawful to take Arms againſt the Kings whoſe* Subjects *they were*. What! *Subjects* without Submiſſion! and this the Dr. quotes too out of them; but then I wonder upon what grounds he ſaid they could have no Legal Right to Govern *Iſrael*; for if the ſubmiſſion of the Prince can Transfer a Legal Right, then they had a Legal Right, and then

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to

to be ſure they could have what they actually had. If it be ſaid that God was at that time their Sovereign, and He did not ſubmit; it is true He did not, but the Text ſays expreſly, that God delivered them into their Hands. But then this would be an Argument againſt their Submiſſion; For the Dr. tells us, that where God entails the Crown, the People were not to ſubmit to any Uſurper, if the Right Heir was alive; and therefore much more where God himſelf was their King, and then ſure they might lawfully reſiſt theſe Kings whoſe Subjects they were not, nor could be, and they needed no eſpecial Commiſſion or Direction, to deſtroy the Uſurpers as *Ahud* did *Æglon*, but they might, nay, they were bound to do it, as *Jehoiada* ſlew *Athaliah*. For I hope God's Entail is not of greater force than his own immediate Government; ſo that either their Submiſſion Transferr'd a Legal Right, or elſe their Submiſſion was a ſin.

The Dr. aſſerts, That the Convocation ſpeaks of *Illegal* and *uſurped* Powers; But the Dr's Proofs from them are only of *Legal* Powers. And conſequently, that only Legal Powers have God's Authority, and a Government is then throughly ſettled, when it becomes Legal. The Dr. will not, but the Convocation diſtinguiſhes between the means of acquiring a Power, and the Power it ſelf; the means of acquiring Power may be very unjuſt and *Illegal*, and yet the Power afterwards may be very *Legal*, But the Dr. is reſolv'd they muſt be all one, and becauſe the Convocation ſpeaks of the Ambition of Encroaching Kings, and the Rebellion of Subjects, as a means whereby Governments have been alter'd, therefore by a Government being *thorough ſettled*, they muſt needs mean uſurped Powers. As if it was impoſſible, for ſuch beginnings afterwards to acquire a Right, and ſo Terminate in a Legal Title, and 'till that is, the Government is as unjuſt as the Rebellion and Encroachment: And a man cannot juſtly become a party to the Government no more than to the Rebellion, for they are both equally unjuſt, except the Dr. thinks that ſtealing a Purſe is very unjuſt, but the keeping it after it is ſtoln, is very juſt. I will grant the Dr. that a Government, by what ill means ſoever attain'd, may have God's Authority, and be thoroughly ſettled; but then I ſay, it has not God's Authority, nor is thoroughly ſettled, till it ſtands upon the Foundation of *Right*, and becomes *Legal*. The Convocation never mentions Uſurpation, or, Uſurper, name or thing, but in one place, and that is the Caſe of *Athaliah*, and they plainly condemn it, and juſtifie the killing her; but in the other inſtances of Government in that Book, a Legality is implyed; or in expreſs Terms affirmed, *chap.* 31. it is ſaid when *Alexander* was dead, the *Jews* were free, *none of his Captains having any* Lawful *Intereſt or Title to* Judah; plainly intimating that *Alexander* himſelf, and the *Perſian* before him, had a Lawful Intereſt and Title; and they likewiſe tell us of the *Romans*, that they were the *Lawful* Magiſtrates of the *Jews*. But nothing will ſerve the Dr's turn, but the Power muſt be as unjuſt as the means; and if it was granted him, I wonder what he would make of it. That would certainly be a very odd reaſon for Subjection, he that partakes with Injuſtice, (as he certainly does that joyns with it) partakes with the Guilt too. And if the Power be unjuſt, then to abet, to defend, ſupport and maintain that Power, muſt be unjuſt likewiſe. The Dr's ſhift of Legal Rights, and God's Rights will ſtand him in no ſtead, for that will ſerve all Caſes as well as his; God hath a Right to take away any mans Life, or Eſtate, as well as a Throne. But if this be done by Illegal Ways; it is not God's Right and

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Sovereignty that hinders, but we are bound to purſue the Wicked Inſtruments, and to bring them to Puniſhment; and whoever adheres to them is a Thief and a Murderer equal to them. And if we forſake the Laws and the plain Rules of Practice, and apply our ſelves to Providences, and God's Rights of Creation, we muſt be forced to quit Truth and Juſtice, and adhere to a Company of Thieves, Lyars, and Murderers.

3. To the Caſe of *Joaſh* and *Athaliah*, the Dr. gives two Anſwers.

1 The firſt is this: *All that this* Pag. 34. *Story amounts to is no more than this, That when a Legal and Rightful Heir is actually poſſeſſed of the Throne, the ſubjects may return to their Allegiance, and by his Authority proſecute the uſurper*, &c. I Anſwer, The Story amounts to a great deal more; and that is, That Subjects may ſet the Rightful Heir upon the Throne, altho it be in the actual Poſſeſſion of an Uſurper; for ſo *Jehoiada* and the People did: they ſet up the Right Heir, and ejected the Uſurper, tho ſhe had been in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne for ſix Years. But (ſaith the Dr.) *The Rightful Heir was actually poſſeſſed of the Throne, for Joaſh was firſt Anointed and Proclaimed, before any one ſtirred a finger againſt* Athaliah. But is the Dr. ſure, that *Joaſh* was actually Poſſeſſed of the Throne? He was Anointed indeed: But is Anointing actual Poſſeſſion? and it will not be eaſie to prove it according to the Drs. Notion of Poſſeſſion, of having the the whole Adminiſtration of Affairs, and all the Authority of the Kingdom in his hands, for ſure *Athaliah* had ſome: But however, who Anointed? and who Proclaimed him? And who put him in Poſſeſſion? Why truly no body elſe but his own Subjects, and theſe very Men that had lived ſix Years under the Uſurper. And then I percieve that Subjects may ſtand by the Rightful Heir againſt an Uſurper, tho poſſeſſed of the Throne for ſome Years. But then, where is that Fidelity, Allegiance and Obedience, that the Dr. ſays, we are bound to pay to Uſurped Powers? But for all that, the Dr. goes on, and ſays, *Now this is a very different Caſe from raiſing Rebellion againſt a Prince who is in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne, to reſtore an ejected one.* And I pray, where is this difference? A Man muſt open his Eyes wide, that can ſee it; Was not *Athaliah* in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne when *Jehoiada* Anointed *Joaſh*? The Dr. may call this *Rebellion* if he pleaſe, and *Athaliah* called it *Treaſon*, and perhaps upon the Drs. Principles: But for all that, *Jehoiada* and the People did their Duty to their Rightful Prince, and ſlew her that was in Poſſeſſion of the Throne. And that I ſuppoſe is no great Sign that they thought Poſſeſſion of the Throne by Providence was God's Authority, or that Allegiance was due upon that account. I know there is a difference between Anointing a New King, and Reſtoring an Ejected one. But the Queſtion is concerning Allegiance to an Uſurper in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne, and as to that there is no difference. For theſe pay as little Allegiance to an Uſurper, who Anoint a King, and then Depoſe him, as thoſe who do it to reſtore an ejected one: And I would fain know what difference there is (as to Allegiance to an Uſurper) between Anointing a New King, and upon his Authority diſpoſſeſſing an Uſurper, and doing the ſame thing upon the Authority of one already Anointed.

2. His other Anſwer is, *That God himſelf hath intail'd the Kingdom of* Judah *on the Poſterity of* David, *and therefore nothing could juſtifie their Submiſſion to an uſurper when the Kings Son was found; but in other Kingdoms where Entails are made by Providence, there the placing a Prince in*

in the Throne, is a Reaſon to ſubmit to him as God's Ordinance and Miniſter.

To this I anſwer:

1. This Diſtinction is not in the *Convocation-Book*, and ſo it does not affect their Senſe: They do not ſpeak with reference to it, when they call *Athaliah* an Uſurper, and juſtifie the Proceedings of *Jehoiada* and the People againſt her; but the Reaſon they give is general, *The Right Heir of the Kingdom being alive*, which extends to all Kingdoms that are entail'd, and go by Succeſſion: And it is plain they thought of no ſuch Difference as to this matter: but that a thorough Settlement of a Government (and tho attained by the ſame ill means) was the ſame thing, and had God's Authority in *Judah* as well as any other Nation, as in the Inſtances of the *Babylonians*, *Macedonians* and *Romans*, whoſe Government over the *Jews* was not attained by honeſter means than *Athaliah's*, and was as much contrary to the entail upon *David's* Houſe as hers; and yet they juſtifie and require Obedience to them, but juſtifie the ſlaying of her: And therefore it is plain, that by a *thorough Settlement* they do not mean a full Poſſeſſion of Power, for *Athaliah* had as full a Poſſeſſion of Power in the Kingdom of *Judah*, as had the *Babylonians*, *Macedonians*, or *Romans*, nor do they reckon God's Entail upon *David's* Poſterity any ground of Difference in this matter, for the Government of *Judah* by *Babylonians* was as much contrary to that Entail, as the Government of *Athaliah*.

2. The Drs. Arguments will equally juſtifie Submiſſion to *Athaliah* in the Kingdom of *Judah*, notwithſtanding ſuch entail, as to an Uſurper in any other Nation. I ſhall inſtance in two; his Argument from Providence, and his Argument from the neceſſity of Government for the Preſervation of Human *Society*.

1. His Arguments from Providence: Theſe equally fit *Athaliah*, and ſhe had the ſame Pretenſions to Providence, as any other Uſurper hath or can have: The Dr. tells us expreſly, *That it makes no difference in this Caſe to diſtinguiſh between what God permits, and what he does; for this diſtinction does not relate to the events of things, but to the Wickedneſs of Men, which God only permits; but the Events of all things are in his hands, and are ordered and diſpoſed by his Will and Council, as they muſt be, if God governs the World.* Pag. 12. Now, according to this Doctrin, *Athaliah's* Uſurpation was the Act of God, and as much ſo as any other Uſurpation: *Her wicked Counſels and Deſigns* God only permitted, as he does thoſe of other Uſurpers; but her actual Poſſeſſion of the Throne was what God appointed, and was as much ordered and diſpoſed by his *Decree* and *Council*, as that of any Uſurper in the whole World. Farther, the Dr. ſays, *If there were ſuch a Diſtinction, we ought in reaſon to aſcribe the Advancement of Kings to Gods decree and council, becauſe it is the principle Act of Providence which has ſo great an influence on the Government of the World; and if he decree and order any events, certainly he peculiarly orders ſuch events as will do moſt good, or moſt hurt to the world.* And this fits *Athaliah's* Caſe as well as any other; and it ſeems her Advancement to the Throne was not only God's Decree, but his *peculiar* Decree and Order; for that event as well as any other Uſurpation, had a great influence, and might do much good or hurt in the World. Farther yet according to this Doctrine, the Dr. ſays, That *ALL Kings* (and then ſure *Athaliah* among the reſt) *are equally Rightful with reſpect to God; for thoſe are all Rightful Kings, who are placed in the Throne by God,* (as *Athaliah* was) *and it is impoſſible there ſhould be a wrong King, unleſs a Man could make himſelf* Pag. 14.

ſelf King whether God will or no. Now I only ſuppoſe, that *Athaliah* could not do what is *impoſſible*, nor (if ſhe had never ſo much mind to it) could ſhe make herſelf Queen, *whether God would or no.* The Dr. further adds, *He is our King who is ſetled in the Throne in the actual Adminiſtration of Sovereign Power, for King is the Name of Power and Authority, not of mere Right.* Now *Athaliah* had the actual Adminiſtration of Sovereign Power, and therefore according to the Dr. ſhe was Queen by God's Authority, tho not by the Law of the Land, and Allegiance muſt be due to her as well as to any other. And all the Drs. Arguments are as concluſive and valid for Submiſſion to *Athaliah*, as for Submiſſion to any Body elſe: But if theſe Reaſonings be naught with reſpect to her, ſo are they alſo with reſpect to any other Uſurpation; for if theſe be not certain Signs of God's Decree and Council, That a Perſon ſo poſſeſſed of the Throne, ſhould be own'd as King, and ſubmitted to, then they are no Rule for us; if they are, then they were a Rule for the *Jews*, and 'tis mere trifling to talk of God's entailing the Crown, as if God was tyed any more to the entails of his own making, than he is to Human Entails, and his own Decrees and Orders would not cut off his own Entails, as well as thoſe of men. If the Poſſeſſion of the Throne by Providence be a clear and demonſtrative Evidence, that ſuch a Perſon hath God's Authority, and that God would have him obey'd as King, then it's ſo notwithſtanding any Entail made by himſelf: But then if it be not ſuch a demonſtrative Evidence, not only the Doctor's Diſtinction is uſeleſs to his purpoſe, but all his Arguments are unconcluſive and ſignifie nothing.

pag. 38. 2. His Argument drawn from the neceſſity of Government to the preſervation of Human Society; now I ſuppoſe the Dr. will grant me, that the People of *Judah* were a Human Society, and then there is not one Argument the Dr. uſes, but what will equally conclude for ſubmiſſion to *Athaliah* as to any other Uſurper, and the Dr. here argues from the nature of the thing, which is equally the ſame in all Governments. Now the Dr. tells us, That *Human Societies muſt not diſſolve into a Mobile, or Mr.* Hobs's *ſtate of Nature, becauſe the Legal Prince has loſt his Throne, and can no longer Govern. For the end of Civil Government, is the ſafety and tranquillity of Human Societies, and whatſoever is neceſſary and uſeful to this end, becomes a duty.* Now the ſafety of the *Jewiſh* Society was as much the end of that Government as of any other, and if for the preſervation of Human Society, it be neceſſary to ſubmit to an Uſurper, it was likewiſe neceſſary for the People of *Judah* to ſubmit to *Athaliah*, but it was not neceſſary for their preſervation, or if that neceſſity would not juſtifie their Submiſſion to an Uſurper in that Kingdom, then it is plain that ſuch a Submiſſion cannot be warranted from the ends of Government, let theſe ends be what they will. It is not to be doubted but men may do ſome things for the preſervation of a Society, while they are under an Uſurper; but that will not ſerve the Drs. turn except they go through with the matter, and do every thing that is due to a rightful King. Biſhop *Sanderſon* owns it lawful to pay ſome kind of ſubmiſſion, as to defend the Country againſt a Forein Enemy, to preſerve Trade and Commerce, *&c.* But without any regard to the Authority of the Uſurper or his Laws; for he has no Authority, and his Laws do not oblige in Conſcience, *&c.* Now the Dr. tells us, *He cannot be of his mind, for if the ſafety and tranquillity of* pag. 38. *Human Societies require any thing of us, it both requires and juſtifies a great*

deal

deal more: Well, whatſoever it requires, I hope it required as much in the Kingdom of *Judah* as any where elſe. And by that we ſhall eaſily diſcern the force of the Dr's Argument.

1. He ſays, *As the Biſhop ſtates the matter, this deſtroys Civil Government, and a governed ſociety, for here is neither King nor Subject, no Authority to command, nor duty to obey, and no man will call this a Civil Government, or ſociety to which Authority and Obedience is Eſſential.* Well now, I ask the Dr. what muſt the Subjects of *Judah* do, *Athaliah* had got the Poſſeſſion of the Throne for ſix years, and what would become of Society all that while? why 'tis plain as can be, they muſt own her Authority, and pay Allegiance to her: For ſays the Dr. *If Human Societies muſt be preſerv'd, then the neceſſities of Government give Authority to the Prince, and lay an Obligation of Duty on the Subject: if God will preſerve Human Societies, we muſt conclude, that when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him, whom he places there; for without Authority, Human Societies muſt diſband.* This methinks is very bold, as if God had no other way of preſerving Human Society, but according to our Fancies, and Scheme of *Politicks*, but however it concludes ſufficiently againſt the Dr. for if Human Society cannot be preſerv'd, but by the Authority of an Uſurper, and if God will preſerve Human Society, it muſt be concluded that he hath given his Authority to him that Poſſeſſes the Throne, then he had given his Authority to *Athaliah*, or elſe all theſe dreadful conſequences muſt follow, and the Society of *Judah* muſt diſband, and come to nothing. But then if it did not neceſſarily follow, that ſuch ſtrange things muſt come to paſs in the 6 years of *Athaliahs* Uſurpation; or however that that was not a ſufficient Reaſon for transferring their Allegiance to her, then 'tis plain that the Dr's Argument, from the Nature of the thing is not true; Nor does he conclude rightly from it. And the Caſe is the ſame in what follows.

2. *I would ask* (ſays he) *whether the Care of my own preſervation, and publick duty*, &c. *do oblige me in Conſcience to obey, and ſubmit to the Government, and the Prince who governs, and to wiſh, and pray for, and do my utmoſt to endeavour their proſperity*; if it does, this is the ſame with Allegiance, and then *we may ſwear it too*; *if not, then I am at liberty to diſturb the Government*; *and how* (ſays the Dr.) *does this contribute to the ſafety, and Tranquillity of Human Societies?* That queſtion it does not concern me to anſwer; But this I ſay, that if it proves that we are bound in Conſcience, for the ſafety of Societies, to pray for, and to endeavour the proſperity of an Uſurped Government; it proves alſo that the people of *Judah*, were obliged in Conſcience to do the ſame for *Athaliah*; and if it does not prove that, then it does not prove, that the Tranquillity of Human Society is a ſufficient Reaſon to Oblige Men in Conſcience to ſubmit to, to pray for, and to endeavour the Proſperity of an Uſurper.

3. *Suppoſe the Government ſhould not think it ſelf ſafe, to leave all Men at liberty to diſturb it, but ſhould require an Oath of Fidelity, which is the Univerſal Practice of all Governments*, what ſhould the Subjects of *Judah* do in this Caſe? Why truly there is no remedy, they muſt e'en ſwear; for the Dr. tells us, *Should every Man refuſe the Oath, and the Prince had Power enough to compel, what muſt be the effect of this, but the utter Ruin and deſtruction of the Nation.* But then if all this, and ten times more would not prove, that the People of *Judah* might lawfully ſwear Allegiance to *Athaliah*, then it will prove that the Dr. is miſtaken in his Argument, and nothing can be concluded

cluded from it. I ſhall paſs over his next Reaſon, which notwithſtanding is equally applicable to the ſame purpoſe, and come to his

5. Which is concerning the preſumed conſent of the ejected Prince. Now (ſays the Dr.) *If we will preſume, we ſhould preſume all that is reaſonable, i. e. all that is neceſſary for the preſervation of his Subjects, when he can Govern them no longer; and then we may preſume his Conſent to Oaths of Allegiance*; all this I hope may be preſumed as well in *Judah*, as any other Country. But now the Dr. comes to Clench the Buſineſs, *and tho he will not meddle with that Queſtion, whether a King leaving his Kingdoms in a Fright be Abdication*; yet this (ſaith he) *one may reaſonably preſume, That a King who forſakes his Kingdom to conſult his own ſafety, will give his Subjects leave to conſult theirs; if this will juſtifie a King to ſave himſelf by leaving his Kingdom, why will it not juſtifie Subjects, when their King has left them, to ſubmit and comply with the prevailing Powers, as far as is neceſſary to preſerve themſelves? That is, even by Oaths of Allegiance, if that be neceſſary.* Pag. 42. Now let us Transfer this to the Kingdom of *Judah*, *Athaliah* had killed as many of the Kings Children as ſhe could find, to make way for herſelf, and *Joaſh* was taken away to ſave his life. And therefore the People of *Judah* might Conſult their ſafety, and to ſave their Places, and Preferments, might become her Subjects, and pay her the ſame Allegiance as was due to the moſt Lawful Prince in the World, and ſwear an Oath of Fidelity to her to defend her againſt all Men, even againſt him, whom they own'd, and acknowledg'd had the Right to the Throne. For (ſaith the Dr.) *Self-Preſervation is as much a Law to Subjects as to the Prince.* But then, if it does not prove that, then the Biſhop is in the right, and the Dr. in the wrong. And whatever elſe we may do to preſerve the Societies, and our ſelves. We may not ſwear Allegiance, nor own the Authority of an Uſurper.

And now are not theſe pure Arguments? The Inſtance the Dr. pretends to anſwer, ſets them in a clear light, and diſcovers the fallacy of them better than any trains of Diſcourſe. The Dr. knows, that an Argument that proves too much, is as faulty as one that proves too little: Every body ſees that they prove nothing in that Caſe, that has reſpect to them, and therefore they prove no thing in ours, and with reſpect to us; for there is not one Argument (if it have any force) but what equally concludes for their Submiſſion to an Uſurper, as for us; for the ends of Government are the ſame in all Countries, and ſelf-Preſervation, and Preſervation of Society, and the neceſſity of Government in order to it. All theſe are the ſame with reſpect to *Judah* as to any other Society, for I hope God's entail did not make the preſervation of the Society to be a leſs duty in them than in others. If it be ſaid the Providence of God will take care in ſuch extraordinary caſes, I ſay ſo too; but then this is univerſal likewiſe, and the Dr. who hath talked ſo much of Providence, might have let us have ſome of it here, where 'tis ſeaſonable and proper, and the Application true; in all ſuch ſtreights and difficulties, we muſt refer our ſelves to God's Providence, to find out a way for the ſafety of our ſelves and the Society, and not make a way for our ſelves, and act unwarrantably; and I am certain we have more ground to hope that God will preſerve us and our Society, by keeping ſtrictly to our duty, than by taking up unjuſtifiable Methods of our own. A Kingdom can hardly be ſuppoſed to be in greater ſtreights in this matter, than the Kingdom of *Judah* was all thoſe ſix Years of *Athaliah*'s Uſurpation; but for all that, theſe formidable buſineſſes, of *diſbanding Societies, of ruining*

ing a Nation, was no reason at all for their swearing to her; but they trusted God's Providence, and so must we, which (as the Dr. can tell us when it serves his turn) *takes care of all extraordinary Cases, and there we must leave them.*

What follows in the Dr. is mighty fine: *He does not think that Protection and Allegiance; but he thinks* Pag. 4. *Government and Allegiance are such Relatives, as the one cannot subsist without the other, if the Prince cannot Govern, the People cannot Obey*; and therefore forsooth, because they cannot obey him, they must fight against him, and kill him, and do their utmost to ruin him: for saith he, *As far as he quits his Government he quits their* (his Subjects) *Allegiance, and leaves his Subjects as he does his Crown, to be possessed by another*; that is, so soon as *Joash* was taken away and hid, the Subjects were forthwith discharged of their Allegiance to him, and they as well as his Crown, were to be possessed by *Athaliah*; for as the Dr. says, *He may have a Legal Right to both, but he cannot actually have the Subjects Allegiance without the Crown; nor can Subjects pay him their Allegiance without his being restored to the Possession of his Throne, no more than they can obey, when he cannot command.* Now the Dr. tells us, *This is as certain as any Proposition in Logic*: And for all that, it is as plain a fallacy as ever I met with, and the instance before us lays it open, and I ask the Dr. Was the Restoring *Joash* to the Throne an Act of their Allegiance or no? If not, What Duty was it? But if it was, then Allegiance follows the Person of the King, tho he be out of then Possession of the Pag. 35. Throne. I know the Dr. tells us, *That JOASH was first Anointed, and proclaimed, before any one stirred a Finger against ATHALIAH*; But if that made any alteration in the matter, had *Athaliah* come but an hour sooner, the Subjects must have been all her own, for (she was in Possession of the Throne) and were bound in Conscience to stand by her, and if she required it to have knocked *Joash* on the head, as a Capital Enemy to her Government. But the Dr. knows well enough, that his Anointing and Proclaiming did not make him King, but that (according to the Rules of Succession in that and other Kingdoms) he was King all the time of *Athaliah's* Usurpation, and Allegiance was due to him, and upon the Account of that they restored him. And then it follows, that Allegiance is due to a Prince, tho his Throne be possessed by an Usurper. The Foundation the Dr. builds all this upon is a mistake, *And that is, That Government and Allegiance are such Relatives as do MUTUO SE PONERE ET TOLLERE.* Now by Government the Dr. means the Actual Administration of it. And then Government and Allegiance are so far from being such Relatives, that they are no Relatives at all, they are only the Acts of Relatives, and to say the Acts of Relatives are Relatives, is so far from *being as certain as any Proposition in Logic*, that it is Logical Non-sence; it is to say, That the Actual Government of a Master, and the Obedience of Servants are Relatives; so that if a Master be Spirited away, or taken Captive, so as he can give no Directions in his Family, nor Actually Govern it, his Servants immediately cease to be his Servants, and the Relation is extinct, and when in some time after he recovers his Liberty and returns to his Family, he finds his House thrown out at windows, or his Servants flown, or his Family bestowed upon another Master that will Govern it, for they have nothing to do with him; the Relation was only between his Actual Govern-

Government and their Obedience: And saith the Dr. *When one of the Relatives is lost, the Relation is destroy'd, and nothing but the Memory of it left.* The Relation is only between King and Subject, and the Actual Administration of Government of the one hand and paying Allegiance on the other, are but the Acts of that Relation, and Consequential to it, but are not Relatives themselves, nor do they, *mutuo se ponere & tollere*; if a Subject is taken Captive, or otherwise hindered from paying Actual Allegiance, is the Relation lost, and does he therefore immediately cease to be a Subject? And therefore neither doth a King, if he be hindered from the Actual Administration of Government, cease to be a King; but hath the same Right to our Allegiance, in and out of Possession: Allegiance was due to *Joash*, before he Actually administred the Government; Nay, when an Usurper Actually Administred it, and so it was to *David*, tho he fled out of the Country.

Before I have done with this instance, there is another thing to be remark'd from it; the Dr. in his Preface tells us concerning Schism, that the Principles a Pamphlet proceeds upon, are such as would have made all the *Jews* Schismaticks, when the High Priest became Annual, and makes the *Greek* Church Schismaticks, as often as the *Grand Seignior* changes their Patriarch. Now I have but one question to ask him, and it is in the instance before us; suppose *Athaliah* should have depos'd *Jehoiada*, and put another High Priest in his place, who were the *Jews* bound in Conscience to Communicate with? or does he believe they would have deserted *Jehoiada*, and have joyn'd themselves any more to *Athaliah*'s High Priest, than they did to *Athaliah* herself: When the Dr. gives me a clear answer to this, he shall hear more of my mind.

3. The Dr's Distinction is against him. 'Tis true, God did entail the Kingdom of *Judah* on the Family of *David*, and for that reason they ought not to submit to an Usurper, but this is so far from being a Reason, why they may Submit to one in other Kingdoms, where Entails are made by Laws, that it is a Reason, and a very good one, why they ought not: For God's entailing the Crown of *Judah*, was the Law of that Kingdom in that respect, and the People of other Kingdoms are as much bound to observe their own Laws, as the People of *Judah* were theirs. All Human Laws that are just, bind in Conscience, and (according to the Dr's own Principles) These Laws were made by God's Authority. So that the Dr. mistakes the Question; we do not oppose Human Laws to God's Authority, but we oppose Laws that are made by God's Authority, and which are a Rule to us, to Providence which is no Rule. When God entail'd the Crown upon *David*'s Posterity, they had then a Legal Right to it, and so hath every Family in other Kingdoms upon which an entail is made by the Respective Laws of the Country. King *Charles* II. had as good a Right to the Crown of *England* as *Joash* had to that of *Judah*, and *Cromwell*'s Usurpation was no more a Bar to him, nor gave *Cromwell* by his Possession of the Throne, any more Right to our Allegiance, than *Athaliah*'s was against *Joash*; or than her Possession gave her a Right to the Allegiance of the People of *Judah*: God gave other Political Laws to his People, as well as this of Succession, but will any Man say therefore, that the Municipal Laws in other Countries were not in all Respects as binding, to the Respective People. But to come nearer to our purpose: The Division of the Land of *Canaan* to the Twelve Tribes was expressly Commanded by GOD himself; and here we may try the full strength of the Dr's Argument. The Possession of

of the Land of *Canaan*, to each Tribe and Family was allotted, and appointed by God's expreſs Command, but the Poſſeſſions in all other Countries, are only by his Providence. And therefore (according to the Doctor's way of Reaſoning) every Man that wrongfully poſſeſſed himſelf of another Man's Eſtate in that Land, muſt be made to reſtore it; for God had expreſly given it to the other, and to his Family. But in all other Countries, if a Man by Providence, get his Neighbor's Eſtate, he muſt have it; for the Event is God's Act, and 'tis his evident Decree, and Council, that he ſhould have it, and to deny it, *is to ſay that God as well as Men, is confin'd to human Laws* in diſpoſing of Eſtates. But now if this be falſe Reaſoning, and ſuch Acts of Providence are no ſign that it is God's Will he ſhould have the Eſtate, but the Laws of the Land muſt take place notwithſtanding; Then it is plain the Doctor's Diſtinction is vain, and there is not that difference in this reſpect, between the Laws that God himſelf makes, and thoſe that are made by his Authority; for God gave the Eſtates of private Men to them and their Heirs, as expreſly as he did entail the Crown upon *David*'s Family.

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There is one thing the Dr. aſſerts, which (if it were true) would overthrow all that is ſaid, and therefore deſerves to be conſidered; and that is, that *the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conſcience, when they do not contradict the Laws of God; but when they do, they are no Rule to us, but their Obligation muſt give place to a Divine Authority*: Thereby intimating that the Laws of God command us to pay all the Obedience of Subjects to Uſurped Powers, and therefore we are bound to Obey them with reſpect to the Laws of God, though we are forbid ſo to do by the Laws of the Land. Now if the Doctor could prove this as ſtrongly, as he affirms it, he hath gained the Cauſe; for there is no diſpute, but we muſt Obey the Laws of God, before thoſe of Men. But where is this Law of God that commands us to Obey Uſurpers? Where is it ever affirm'd in Scripture in expreſs Terms, or deduced from thence by evident Conſequence? This Law had need be very clear and evident, and the Dr. had need be very ſure of it, when he builds not only his Book, but his Practice upon it, in plain Contradiction (by his own Confeſſion) to the Laws of the Land. He owns the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conſcience, and if thoſe be clear and certain, and it be doubtful, and uncertain, whether the other be the Law of God or no, unbiaſſed Conſcience would ſoon determine the Caſe, that we are bound to follow that which is certain and plain, rather than that which is doubtful and obſcure: Now that it is not clear, that there is ſuch a Law of God, is evident, not only from the Controverſies about it in the late diſmal Times of Uſurpation, but that no Learned Men could ever eſpy this Law, before the times of *John Goodwyn*, and the Dr. muſt have a great opinion of his own Judgment, if he think that himſelf, *John Goodwyn*, and Mr. *Eaton*, can bear up the Authority of this Interpretation againſt all the World. The Dr. himſelf tells us with Reſpect to the Titles of Princes, That *theſe are great Diſputes among Learned Men; and how then ſhould Unlearned Men underſtand them? And I cannot think* (ſaith he) *that the reſolution of Conſcience in ſuch matters as all Mankind are concerned in, ſhould depend upon ſuch Niceties as Learned Men themſelves cannot agree in.* And is not this the Caſe of the main Principle, and indeed the only material Argument in his whole Book? And it concludes more ſtrongly againſt him; for the current Judgment of Learned Men is on the other ſide, and not many, if any Learned Man beſides

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himself, ever held there was such a Law, or concurred with him in his Interpretation of Scripture; so that, if he could give a plausible Account of his own Interpretation, it would hardly be sufficient to warrant such a Book, or such a Practice, contrary to a plain and known Rule, and about which there is otherwise no Controversie. And this I take to be a sufficient Answer; however, I shall briefly Consider what he urges from Scripture.

Those Testimonies he Cites from
Pag. 11. the Old Testament, *That God giveth Kingdoms to whomsoever he will, that he removes Kings, and setteth up Kings, Dan.* 4. 17 & 2. 21. 37. These are certainly true, but nothing to his purpose; for God did always set up, and remove Kings; but this was no Evidence that God would have Usurpers Obeyed as Kings, as is evident in the Case of *Athaliah*. And God did as much remove Kings, and set up Kings in the Kingdom of *Judah*, as in any other Kingdom. And therefore it cannot from these Expressions be necessarily concluded, That every Person that gets Possession of the Throne, is a King, and ought to have the Duties belonging to a King, paid to him. But the truth is, the Doctor throughout his Book, begs the Question: He takes it for granted, That every Usurper is a King, when that is the thing to be proved; and he knows all Learned Men deny that an Usurper is a King, as *Athaliah* was no Queen, though she had got the Possession of the Throne; and what is setting up Kings to an Usurper, who is no King. However, when Persons have Possession of the Throne who have a Legal Title, either by Descent or other Acquisition, and who are Kings by the Consent of all Mankind, it is plain, that God sets them up. And it cannot necessarily be concluded, that any more is meant by God's setting up Kings. And if it cannot be necessarily concluded, then here is not from thence any sufficient Warrant, to call every Usurper God's King, and to pay Duties to them accordingly; as *Athaliah* was not God's Queen, though she had Possession of the Throne, and though God remov'd, and set up Kings then, as well as in any other Age.

His Testimony from the New Te-
stament is, *Rom.* 13. 1, 2. *Let every* Pag. 18.
Soul be Subject to the Higher Powers, for all Power is of God, &c. Now by *Powers* (contrary to the current of all good Interpreters) the Doctor understands Usurped as well as Lawful Powers; and his Reason is because the *Scripture makes no distinction between Kings, and Usurpers*. Now I had thought the Case of *Athaliah* had been a Distinction, and had this Precept been given in those days, I wonder whether any Body would have doubted of whom it ought to be understood, whether of *Athaliah*, or *Joash*. But Pag. 19.
(saith the Doctor) *If the Apostle had intended such a Distinction, he ought to have said it in expres words*. And why so I pray? Does not the Nature of the thing sufficiently distinguish it? And are there not general Rules about Right and Wrong, which extend to all Persons and Cases? Does not the Doctor himself tell us, that S. *Peter* explains S. *Paul*, *Submit your selves to* Case of
the King (i. e.) saith the Dr. in S. Resist.
Paul's Phrase to the *Higher Powers*; P. 142.
and is there any need in such Injunctions to distinguish between a King and no King? The *Apostle* exhorts *to Obey* Heb. 13.
them that have Rule over you, meaning the Minister of the Gospel; now 17.
the *Apostle* makes no distinction between lawful Ministers and Intruders; and therefore if any Man can but get a Congregation, he must be the Person understood in this Precept, and the Dr. knows there has been as much Usurpation of the Ministry as ever was of Civil Government. In short, the Dr's Reason for his Interpretation is against

againſt him, There has ever been a Diſtinction in the World between Legal and Uſurped Powers, and 'tis probable enough that St. *Paul* (who was ſo Learned a Man) knew it; and if he had intended to enjoin Obedience to Uſurped Powers, 'tis probable he would have ſaid ſo in expreſs Terms; but ſince he never ſaid ſo, we have Reaſon to conclude he never intended it.

4. In Anſwer to the Author, it is aſſerted above, That his Interpretation (and the ſame may be ſaid of the Dr's.) juſtifies an unreaſonable and impious Doctrine, by making the Acts or Permiſſions of Providence, a Rule for Practice, againſt Right and Juſtice. Something of this the Dr. takes notice of, and puts it into an Objection. *Have not Pyrates and Robbers as good a Title to my Purſe, as an Uſurper has to the Crown? Does not the Providence of God order and diſpoſe all theſe Events?* To which the Dr. thus Anſwers; *The Diſpute is not about Human and Legal Right in either Caſe, but about Authority; Now no Man pretends that Thieves and Pyrates have God's Authority.* I Anſwer; What is this to the Purpoſe? I know Thieves and Robbers have not God's Authority, neither hath an Uſurper; but have they not God's Providence as well as an Uſurper? And if Poſſeſſion of *Authority* by Providence, gives a Right to it, Why does not the Poſſeſſion of *my Purſe*, by the ſame Providence give a Right to it? The Dr. puts it into the Objection, *Have not* Robbers as *good a Title* to my Purſe, as an Uſurper to the Crown? And it is certain they have as *good a Title*, for they have the very ſame. I grant, That taking a Purſe, and taking Authority, are two Things, and ſo are alſo Uſurpation and Right. But the Queſtion is about Providence, and that is the ſame; he that takes a Purſe, takes it by Providence, as well as he that takes a Throne; and if Providence gives a Right, the one hath it as well as the other. But, *The Scripture* (ſaith the Dr.) *expreſly tells us, that Kingdoms are diſpos'd of God, that all Power is of God*; and does not the ſame Scripture tell us, that the Earth is the Lord's, and the Fulneſs thereof, that he diſpoſeth of it as he pleaſes, that when *Job* was robbed, he ſaid, *The Lord hath taken away*: But if the Scripture had not ſaid ſo, the Dr. ſays it; for he tells us all Events are God's Act and Deed. And then it muſt follow, that the Poſſeſſion of my Purſe by a Thief, is as much God's Decree and Council, as the Poſſeſſion of the Throne. The Dr. founds all this in God's Creation; *God, ſaith he, is the Natural Lord of the World, becauſe he made it, and no Creature has any Right to Govern the World, or any part of it, but as he receives any Authority from God.* And is not this the ſame in all other Reſpects? Are not all Men's Eſtates God's as well as Authority? And has any Man a Right to his Eſtate, but what God gives him? And does it thence follow, that what ever any Man can get by Providence, though it be never ſo much againſt the Laws and common Right, it is his own, becauſe God is not tied to Human Laws, and hath a Right to the World by Creation, and may give it to whom he pleaſe. And I wonder what Reaſon there is, That 'tis a more certain Sign to us, that the Poſſeſſion of Power by Providence gives any more Right to it, than the Poſſeſſion of Goods, or an Eſtate gives a Right to them.

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5. It is before aſſerted, That the Author's Interpretation reproaches the Virtue and Loyalty of theſe admirable Men that ſuffered between the Years 42 and 60. And the very ſame does the Dr's Interpretation, and all his Arguments: Now this the Dr. takes notice of, but ſays it is *only a Prejudice but no Argument, nor can be formed into an Argument.* And why not I

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pray? I had thought an Argument from Example had been an Argument, though not always a very good one. And yet (when it serves his Purpose) he can make use of a single Example, and that also very doubtful, as the Case of *Jaddus*. But the Example of so many Excellent Men, at once, and fresh in our Memories, and whose very Examples supported the Honour and Reputation of the Protestant Religion, when the Dr's Arguments, and the Practices consequent upon them, made it stink in the Nostrils of the World, and certainly such Examples as these have their Weight, and deserve from us, and all Protestants in the World, high Veneration. And it may justly move any Man's Indignation, to see the Worthies of the World, and of our Church, mocked and diminished, and represented as Knaves or Fools, and all to support a mean and pitiful Argument, that has nothing in it. However the Doctor owns, that this is a Prejudice, and so it is, and a very considerable one: And I wonder what he hath said to remove it; not one Word to the purpose. He tells indeed of some Differences, but not one that is any Difference as to the Matter before us, of Submission to Usurped Powers: I shall put them all together; because the Dr. says, *All together they will be more than Answer enough*; and yet I think all together, and as much more, will not make half an Answer. They are these: *The great Villanies of those Days, bare-faced Rebellion, the Murder of one of the best of Princes, the barbarous Usage of the King's Friends, by Sequestration, Plunders, Imprisonments; Bishops, &c. turned out, the Loyal Clergy could not keep their Livings without renouncing the* Church *of* England: *The whole Government, and the Fundamental Constitution of the Nation was over-turned; And moreover, their Government was never settled, but frequently changed and modelled; and they had not a National Consent and Submission; for the* Rump *was not a Parliament, nor the Representatives of the Nation.* Now the Dr. maintains, That Submission is due to Usurped Powers by what ill Means soever they attain it; And that I think is Answer enough. That the *Villanies* he mentions, makes no Difference in his Argument: The barbarous Usage indeed, made some Difference in point of Interest, but none in point of Conscience: for if they were bound in Conscience to submit, they were so, notwithstanding such Usage. (*Vid. Dr.* Sherlock's *Case of Resistance:*) But the truth is, they met with such Usage, because they did not submit; if they would have submitted, and turn, and become Parties to the Government, they would have used them very kindly; and it may be, have restored their Estates and Livings. As to the *Bishops*, *Deans*, and *Clergy*, the Case is concerning Civil Government, not Ecclesiastical; and I do not find they were bound to abjure *Episcopacy*; and I hope the being disabled to keep a Living, especially if it be a good one, is not a sufficient Reason to Rebel. If that be the Case, King *William* had best take care to keep up the Rights of the Church, or else the Doctor's Oath, and those of his Brethren, do not bind them. As to the overturning the Constitution, that is but changing the Form of Government, as the Dr. knows the Convocation says, *When such Degenerate Forms of Government* are throughly settled; and when the Dr. speaks of Usurped Powers in general, I suppose he does not mean it only of a King, but of a Government. These Usurpers had usurped the Power of the Lords and Commons, as well as of the King, but they were Usurpers still, and no more Usurpers in that than in the other, except the Dr. thinks, that they that Usurp upon the King, must be Obeyed; but they that

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that uſurp upon the Parliament, muſt not. But (ſaith the Dr.) the Government was not ſettled; if he could prove this, he might let all the reſt alone; but why was it not ſettled? *Becauſe it was frequently changed:* but every one of theſe Changes was a *Settlement*, if the Dr's Notion of a Settlement be right, and *Cromwel* was fully poſſeſſed of the Throne for Five Years, and more fully and quietly than the Preſent Government, all *Scotland* and *Ireland*, as well as *England*, was in his Hands. But as to the National Conſent in Parliament, that is indeed part of our Conſtitution, but what is that to Uſurpation, which may uſurp as well upon all Branches of the Conſtitution as upon one. The Dr. tells us, that Legal Rights is not in the Queſtion, God is above Law, and to whom he gives Authority, muſt be obeyed, and the Poſſeſſion of it is an Evidence that he gives it. And if *Cromwel* poſſeſſed the Authority of *Kings*, *Lords* and *Commons*, why then he had God's Authority in all theſe Reſpects, and ought to have been obeyed. And let any Man read the Dr's Notion of a Settlement, (and he tells us he deſpairs of ever ſeeing another) and try if it will not fit *Cromwel* in all Reſpects, juſt as if it had been made for him.

8. But there is one thing more yet behind, and that is an Argument from Intereſt; and that I ſuppoſe is not much better than an Argument from Example: *In the Late Times* (ſaith he) *of Rebellion, all the Friends of Monarchy, &c. were bound in Intereſt to take all opportunities to reſtore the King*; but were they not bound in *Conſcience* to the contrary? If they were not, all the Doctor's Arguments are nothing; if they were, then he has given a very Honorable Character of theſe excellent Men, that they preferred their Intereſt to their Conſciences, which if any Man can believe, then I will engage to believe all the Arguments in the Doctor's Book.

Before I end this, I ſhall offer the Dr. one Argument, and it is this: If Poſſeſſion of Sovereign Power, contrary to Law, be God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed, then whatever Sovereign Power a Prince poſſeſſes himſelf of, is likewiſe God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed: For, the formal Reaſon of Obedience to ſuch a Prince is, becauſe he hath God's Authority; and the Evidence that he hath that Authority, is, becauſe he is poſſeſſed of Sovereign Power. And therefore, ſo far as a Prince can poſſeſs himſelf of Sovereign Power, ſo far he hath God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed. Now I take it for granted, and the Dr. will not deny it, That to be Abſolute and Arbitrary is not inconſiſtent with the notion of Sovereign Power: If therefore a Prince in a limited Monarchy, reſolves to be Arbitrary, (which the Doctor grants may very eaſily be, when he has all the Power of the Kingdom in his Hands, and muſt not be reſiſted) to make his Will the Law, and to exerciſe an illegal Power, he muſt be obeyed, as God's Authority, whatſoever the Laws of the Land ſay to the contrary. For, the Dr. tells us, *That when the Laws of the Land contradict the Laws of God, they are no Rule to us, but their Obligation muſt give place to Divine Authority*: i. e. When God gives a Man Authority; and that is (according to him) when he is by Providence poſſeſſed of it, he muſt be obeyed, notwithſtanding any Injunction of Human Laws. So that if a Judge ſwear to adminiſter Juſtice according to the Laws, or, if he does not ſwear, he is obliged to it; yet if the King command him to give Sentence without Trial, or Forms of Law, he

Caſe of Reſiſt. p. 134.

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he is bound to do it, for the Obligation he has to the Laws muſt give place to the Authority of God, which the King is poſſeſſed of. And then, alas! what will become of us, who refuſed to read the *Declaration*, and the Gentlemen of *Magdalen College*? we thought the Laws were our Rule, and they their Statutes, and ſo it ſeems they were; but if they contradicted the Authority of God as they did, if they contradicted the Power the King was poſſeſſed of, their Obligation ceaſed. Now, I ſuppoſe, no Body at that time diſputed K. J's Power, if he had only commanded them to chuſe another Preſident contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, and had not been able to *Cruſh them*, if they refuſed, (the Dr's Characteriſtick of a Settlement in the Poſſeſſion of Power) then the Statutes were their Rule, and they were bound in Conſcience to obſerve them; but if he were able to *Cruſh* them, (as what he actually did he was certainly able to do) then their Obligation was to give place to the Authority of God, manifeſted by Poſſeſſion of Power, and they were bound in Conſcience to obſerve his Command, contrary to their Statutes and Oaths, in obedience to God's Authority, which is ſuperior to them.

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Now, this is a pretty plain Caſe; and if the Dr's Arguments be good, then we our ſelves, and the Fellows of *Magdalen College*, upon pretence of obeying the Laws, have only been diſobeying God's Authority; for the aſſuming an *Illegal Power* is no more againſt the Laws, than *Illegal* and *Uſurped Powers*; and God, when he gives Authority, is confined to our Laws and Conſtitution no more, in the extent of Power, than in the Perſon; and the only Evidence that we have, that God gives it, is Poſſeſſion of it by Providence; and whatſoever Power a Prince is poſſeſſed of, hath the ſame Evidence, and conſequently is a Branch of the ſame Authority. And *Arbitrary Power* is not inconſiſtent with the notion of *Sovereign Power*, and whatever Limitations of *Government* there are now in the World, they are only Limitations made by Human Laws, and of no force againſt God's Authority: That is, in ſhort, there can be nothing ſaid to juſtifie Obedience to a Poſſeſſor of the Throne contrary to Law, but what is of equal force to juſtifie Obedience to the Exerciſe or acts of *Illegal Power*, contrary to Law; and the Conſcience is as much obliged to one as to the other; and that is, That it is not the Laws of the Land, but the Power of the Prince, which is the Rule of Conſcience. And here is the plain Queſtion; Had the Gentlemen of *Magdalen College* complied with the Will and Power of the King, contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, had they in ſo doing been perjured? if they had, then the Laws are to be a Rule, contrary to the Poſſeſſion of Power, let that Poſſeſſion have never ſo much Providential Evidence of God's Authority, and let the Perſon ſo poſſeſſed be never ſo able to *Cruſh them* for Refuſal. But then it will follow, that all the Dr's Arguments of Poſſeſſion by Providence, contrary to Laws, will really ſignifie very little: For, How comes an Oath to Local Statutes to be of more force than an Oath of Allegiance? and, I would fain ſee a Reaſon, why the Laws of a private College ſhould oblige the Members of that Society, more than the Laws of a Kingdom ſhould oblige the Subjects of that Kingdom. If it be ſaid, That though the King exerciſed an Illegal Power, yet he has not throughly ſettled in the poſſeſſion of it, becauſe he had not a National Conſent to it: I ſay ſo too, but then I ſay likewiſe,

wise, that an illegal Power is not throughly settled, nor does bind the Subject to Obedience, 'till it becomes Legal; for a National Consent, may part with the Rights of a Nation, as well as the Consent of a Prince may part with his own Rights. And then it follows, that Possession of Power, tho there be Providence, and an Army in the case, is not a Rule for Obedience to it, as to the Authority of God, but only the Legality of Power.

And thus I have examined all that the Dr. offers from the Convocation Book, and incidentally the main Principles and Arguments of his Book: And if what I have said, be True, with Respect to the Convocation, then I have answered his whole Book, by his own Confession: for he tells us, *That I may not appear to be singular, and to advance Paradoxes, I shall prove it from the Doctrines and Principles of the* Church *of* England. But then, if he hath not proved it from the Doctrins of the *Church* of *England*, as he hath not, if he have not proved it from the Convocation, then by his own Confession he is singular, and advances Paradoxes; and I hope Paradoxes do not need to be answered, let People that write them, challenge as much as they please: And as for Singularity, I confess he has some Company, but such, as he hath no great need to be proud of; *John Goodwyn*, and *Eaton*, and Three or Four more such as They, have maintain'd the very same; and he might as well have challenged us to Answer them, and it had been to as much Purpose; for they have the very same Arguments. But one would have thought amongst Men of the *Church* of *England*, the very Naming them, would have been Answering them. But for any other in any Age, I believe it would be hard to find any single judicious Man, who has ever own'd his Principles, or Sence of Scripture, and any Man that hath ever heard of this Distinction, *Tyrannus sine Titulo, & Tyrannus exercitio*, is able to discover the Novelty of the Dr's Principles; and that he does nothing but maintain Paradoxes, if to maintain Opinions contrary to the general Sense of Mankind, be to maintain Paradoxes.

I shall conclude with the Dr. as I did with the Author, with a Quotation to Confirm what I have said, and with a Request to him;

First, My Quotation shall be out of Dr. *Sherlock's Case of Resistance*, *Pag.* 127. *& Seq.*

Is the Power of Victorious Rebels and Usurpers from God? Did OLIVER CROMWEL *receive his Power from God, then it seems it was unlawful to Resist him too, or to Conspire against him: Then all those loyal Subjects, who refused to submit to him, when he had got the* POWER *into his Hands, were Rebels and Traitors?*

To this I Answer:

That the most prosperous Rebel is not the Higher Powers, while the NATURAL PRINCE, *to whom we owe Obedience and Subjection is in being: And therefore, tho such Men may get the Power into their hands by God's Permission, yet not by God's Ordinance; and he who resists them, does not Resist the Ordinance of God, but the Usurpations of Men.* In Hered-

tary

tary Kingdoms, the King never dies, but the same Minute that the Natural Person of one King dies, the Crown descends upon the next of Blood, and therefore, he who Rebelleth against the Father, and Murders him, continues a Rebel in the Reign of the Son, which Commences with his Fathers Death.

Now the Dr. may say perhaps, that he has renounced this: But it may be true enough, for all that, and so it is for any thing he hath said to the contrary in his New Book; But to satisfie him, I do not quote it for his Authority; for whatever his Honesty is, his Authority is not so much, and I suppose he does not expect it: But I cite it, because it is true, and is a plain declaration of the sence of the Church of *England*, at that time; for this Passage was never yet question'd, 'till he hath now done it himself. And I believe, should any man at that time, have but ask'd him the Question, concerning his present Opinions and Practices, he would have returned such an answer, as *Hazael* gave to *Elisha*, when he Prophetically told him of those things, which he afterwards actually did, *Is thy servant a Dog, that he should do this great thing!* But *Hazael* afterwards changed his mind, and so has the Dr. 2 Kg. 8. 13.

2. My Request to him is, that, when he next publishes a Book, he will not put such an Assertion in the Preface: *Tho I refused the Oaths, I never engaged in any Faction against it: I never made it my business to dissuade men from it*, &c. For *Never* is a very long time, and some body, or other, may chance to remember, and take notice of it; and when they see such a bold Assertion in the Preface, they may be apt to suspect, that all the Book is the same piece.

FINIS.

LONDON,
Printed for *Jos. Hindmarsh*, at the *Golden Ball* in *Cornhil*, against the *Royal Exchange*. 1690.

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